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Case Comments
Copyright Protection for Citations to a Law
Reporter: West Publishing Co. v.
Mead Data Central, Inc.
In 1973, Mead Data Central, Inc. (Mead) introduced
LEXIS, the first successfully marketed computerized legal re-
search system.' Along with the text of judicial opinions,
LEXIS offered users citations to the same cases in the appro-
priate West Publishing Company (West) reporter.2 In 1985,
1. LEXIS was developed in cooperation with the Ohio Bar Association.
Rubin, LEXIS: An Automated Research System, in AUTOMATED LAw RE-
SEARCH 36 (1973). LEXIS became the first commercially successful computer-
assisted legal research system. M. COHEN & R. BERRING, How To FIND THE
LAW 693 (8th ed. 1983). The LEXIS data base contains, among other things,
the full text of federal, state, and specialized court opinions, including some
opinions that are not published anywhere else. Id The data base is divided
into libraries (for example, "GENFED," containing general federal cases) and
subdivided into files (within GENFED, for example, is the file "US," contain-
ing the United States Reports). See MEAD DATA CENTRAL, INC., LEXIS HAND-
BOOK 5 (1980). Cases are retrievable through a "search" for key words within
the libraries and files. For example, a search on the issue of claims for cancer
resulting from asbestos exposure might be phrased, "asbestos w/7 cancer."
This search would produce all cases in the selected library containing "asbes-
tos" within seven words of "cancer." Id at 6. The cases produced are dis-
played in order of decision, most recent first. The user may view and print
either specific segments of a case or the full text.
In addition to full textual research, LEXIS also provides citator services,
special search techniques (for example, the user can call up all decisions by a
particular judge), and access to a wide variety of related data bases that are
part of the Mead Data Central, Inc. (Mead) information system. See M. COHEN
& R. BERRING, supra, at 693-97; see generally MEAD DATA CENTRAL, INC.,
GUIDE TO NEXIS AND RELATED SERVICES (1985); MEAD DATA CENTRAL, INC.,
REFERENCE MANUAL (1985); Stanley, LEXIS: Legal Research & Litigation
Suppor in LEGAL AND LEGISLATIVE INFORMATION PROCESSING 149 (B. Eres
ed. 1980). For a description of the market growth of LEXIS and its competi-
tion with West Publishing Company's (West's) WESTLAW system, see Abram-
son, Kennedy & Pollock, Inside the West Empire, AM. LAw., Oct. 1983, at 90.
2. Conceding the fair use of the first-page citations, West did not chal-
lenge their inclusion in LEXIS. West Publishing Co. v. Mead Data Cent., Inc.,
799 F.2d 1219, 1222 (8th Cir. 1986), cert denied, 107 S. Ct. 962 (1987). See infra
note 90 (discussing West's fair use concession).
West publishes the widely used National Reporter System, a hardbound
collection of federal and state opinions sorted by region, court, or type of deci-
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Mead announced the addition of "star pagination," a feature in-
forming the LEXIS user of the location of internal page breaks
within the West report of an opinion.3 With star pagination,
sion. The system sprang from the enterprising mind of West's founder, John
B. West, in the late 1800s. Mr. West entered the market modestly by publish-
ing a legal newspaper with the opinions of the Minnesota Supreme Court.
Within eight years, his company's reporters encompassed both federal and
state opinions covering the entire nation. Although regional law publishers
fought back, the legal profession deluged West with orders because of its
speed, accuracy, nationwide coverage, and low cost. The company's success
rapidly drove each of its major competitors to abandon its publication, leaving
West alone and dominant by 1889. No other publisher seriously challenged
West's position until the advent of Mead's LEXIS. See W. MARVIN, WEST PUB-
LISHING CoMPANY: ORIGIN, GROWTH, LEADERSHIP 30-49, 121 (1969) (describing
the development of the National Reporter System and West's initial competi-
tors); see also Woxland, "Forever Associated with the Practice of Law": The
Early Years of the West Publishing Company, 5 LEGAL REFERENCE SERVICES
Q. 115 (1985) (reviewing West's history in the early years); see generally
Young, A Look at American Law Reporting in the 19th Century, 68 LAW LIBR.
J. 294 (1975) (reviewing the attitudes of the legal profession toward the revolu-
tion in the publishing industry in the late 1800s).
The LEXIS challenge prompted West to develop its own computerized
legal research system, WESTLAW. Because WESTLAW offers essentially the
same features as LEXIS, the two are intensely competitive. J. KINSOCK,
LEGAL DATABASES ON LINE: LEXIS AND WESTLAW xiii (1985). The compe-
tition has greatly benefited the legal profession because both companies strive
for increased services at lower costs while assimilating the advantageous char-
acteristics of the other. Id. at 77. Comparison of the two systems produces no
clear superiority. Both systems have full-text retrieval, citator capability, and
similar libraries. Both have dedicated terminals, i.e., produced especially for
LEXIS or WESTLAW use, or may be used with certain personal computers.
Id. WESTLAW may cost slightly less, but cost comparison is difficult due to
their different methods of calculating expenses. See id. at 49-58 (comparing
the economics of LEXIS and WESTLAW). According to one source, in 1983
LEXIS sales outpaced WESTLAW nine to one because of West's late start and
early design problems. Abramson, Kennedy & Pollock, supra note 1, at 91. If
this source accurately measured WESTLAW's position, West has made dra-
matic progress. According to a 1986 survey of 192 law firms by the IT Chi-
cago-Kent College of Law, LEXIS's edge in sales was just eight to five. See
Blodgett, More Law Firms are Byte-Sized, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1, 1987, at 19.
3. West Publishing Co., 799 F.2d at 1222, 1228. LEXIS's version of star
pagination would have inserted parenthetically the West reporter page
number in the text of the LEXIS opinion where each West page began. See
Brief for Appellee at 5, West Publishing Co. v. Mead Data Cent., Inc., 799 F.2d
1219 (8th Cir. 1986) (No. 85-5399-MN), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 962 (1987) [here-
inafter Brief for Appellee]. Mead's introduction of star pagination would have
been limited to certain West volumes of federal decisions, including the Fed-
eral Reporter, Federal Reporter, Second Series, Federal Supplement, Federal
Rules Decisions, and United States Claims Court Reporter. Id.
Star pagination is neither new nor unique to LEXIS. Eighty years ago,
the publishers of the United States Supreme Court Reports, Lawyers' Edition
successfully used and defended in court its star pagination to the official
United States Reports. See Banks Law Publishing Co. v. Lawyers' Co-op. Pub-
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LEXIS users would no longer need West's hardbound reporters
to determine the location of material within a West case re-
port.4 Envisioning decreased demand for its reporters, West
sued, claiming copyright infringement.5 The United States Dis-
lishing Co., 169 F. 386, 386 (2d Cir. 1909). In addition, star pagination is cur-
rently used by West itself in its Supreme Court Reporter (reproducing the page
breaks of the United States Reports, published by the United States Govern-
ment Printing Office); its California Reporter (reproducing the page breaks of
the official California Reports and California Appellate Reports, both pub-
lished and copyrighted by Bancroft-Whitney); and its New York Supplement
through volume 200 (reproducing the page breaks in the official New York Re-
ports, Appellate Division Reports, and Miscellaneous Reports, all published by
Lawyers Co-operative Publishing Company and copyrighted by the New York
Secretary of State). See also West Publishing Co., 799 F.2d at 1235 (Oliver, J.,
dissenting in part) (arguing that the long, traditional use of star pagination, in-
cluding that by West itself, weakens West's claim).
LEXIS's competitor, WESTLAW, see supra note 2, does not currently of-
fer star pagination to West's reporters. If LEXIS were able to offer star pagi-
nation, it would gain a temporary advantage over WESTLAW until West could
complete a similar improvement to WESTLAW. On the other hand, if West
ultimately succeeds in preventing LEXIS's star pagination, WESTLAW will
gain a permanent and significant advantage over LEXIS if West chooses to add
star pagination to WESTLAW. West, however, may be hesitant to do so for
the same reason it wishes to prevent Mead's star pagination. That is, West
may fear the potential damage to its reporter market. See infra notes 104, 147
(discussing possible effects of star pagination on West's market).
4. West Publishing Co., 799 F.2d at 1222. Although the district court and
the court of appeals both recognized the detrimental effect of revealing the lo-
cation of the page breaks within a West case report, neither court identified
the importance of that location. See West Publishing Co. v. Mead Data Cent.,
Inc., 616 F. Supp. 1571, 1579 (D. Minn. 1985), affd, 799 F.2d 1219, 1228 (8th Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 962 (1987). The importance of the location of ma-
terial within a West case report derives from the general requirement that in-
ternal page numbers must be set forth in citations to specific material within ajudicial opinion. See, e.g., HARVARD LAw REVIEW ASS'N, A UNIFORm SysTEM
OF CITATION 17 (14th ed. 1986) (requiring internal page citations) [hereinafter
BLUE BOOK]; M. PRICE, H. BrrNER & S. BYsIEwIcz, EFFECTIVE LEGAL RE-
SEARCH 500 (4th ed. 1979) (noting requirement of "spot page references" to
specific pages). For a description of West's role in citations to opinions, see in-
fra note 111.
5. West Publishing Co., 799 F.2d at 1222. West is no stranger to the
courtroom. In its early years, West strenuously litigated its right to obtain
state opinions before official state publication by rival publishers. For exam-
ple, West joined Gould Publishing Company and Lawyers Co-operative Pub-
lishing Company in 1885 in resisting copyright protection for Connecticut's
opinions. In re Gould, 53 Conn. 415, 416, 2 A. 886, 886 (1885) (state court re-
fused to force the state reporter to provide opinions to any publisher other
than the official state publisher, Banks & Brothers). Three years later, Con-
necticut attempted to prevent the same parties from publishing opinions al-
ready obtained. Connecticut v. Gould, 34 F. 319, 319-20 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1888)
(federal court held that because the state could not copyright its opinions,
other publishers were free to publish them prior to official publication). En-
couraged by this result, West, through its employee Peck, sued the Connecti-
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trict Court for the District of Minnesota granted a preliminary
injunction.6 On Mead's appeal, the United States Court of Ap-
cut reporter, Hooker, to compel distribution of opinions. Peck v. Hooker, 61
Conn. 413, 419-20, 23 A. 741, 751 (1892) (state court held that, although the
state might not copyright its opinions, it nevertheless retained the ability to
control their publication; the reporter therefore need not deliver opinions to
rival publishers). See also Banks &-Bros. v. West Publishing Co., 27 F. 50, 60
(C.C.D. Minn. 1886) (opinions of judges are common property of all people and
can be published in advance of the official state reports); Ex parte Brown, 166
Ind. 593, 612-13, 78 N.E. 553, 559 (1906) (court allowed state supreme court
clerk to furnish opinions to West for advance publication); Nash v. Lathrop,
142 Mass. 29, 38-39, 6 N.E. 559, 562-63 (1886) (court prevented attempt by state
reporter to withhold opinions from a legal newspaper publisher after West and
Lawyers' Co-operative began obtaining opinions also). In addition, West has
fought several times to protect the copyright in its headnotes and other origi-
nal material. See, e.g., West Publishing Co. v. Edward Thompson Co., 176 F.
833 (2d Cir. 1910); West Pub. Co. v. Lawyers' Co-op. Pub. Co., 64 F. 360
(C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1894), modified, 79 F. 756 (2d Cir. 1897).
More recently, West has deflected several defamation challenges through
reliance on its status as a reporter of the judiciary's opinions. See Beary v.
West Publishing Co., 763 F.2d 66 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 106 S. Ct. 232 (1985);
Taylor v. West Publishing Co., 548 F. Supp. 61 (D. Minn.), affd, 693 F.2d 837
(8th Cir. 1982); Lowenschuss v. West Publishing Co., 402 F. Supp. 1212 (E.D.
Pa. 1975), affd, 542 F.2d 180 (3d Cir. 1976); see also Garfield v. Palmieri, 193 F.
Supp. 137 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) (defamation suit against a federal judge for publish-
ing his opinion in a West reporter unsuccessful due to doctrine of absolute ju-
dicial immunity), azffd 297 F.2d 526 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 871
(1962).
West also recently prevented another form of computer appropriation
when a research company attempted to put West's key number digest indexes
on computer. Computer Searching Serv. Corp. v. J. Ryan, 439 F.2d 6 (2d Cir.
1971). Even the present combatants have tangled before. In 1976, Mead sued
West for antitrust violations resulting from West's alleged preferential access
to court opinions. Mead eventually dropped the suit. See Abramson, Kennedy
& Pollock, supra note 1, at 91 (describing West's recent legal activity). West
has rarely lost on any of these issues.
Rather than quieting West's litigiousness, the present case has forced
West to assert new claims in court. Bancroft-Whitney Co. recently filed a suit
against West for a declaratory judgment. Bancroft wants to use West's num-
bering system for certain statutes that the Texas Legislature failed to number.
See Brief Amicus Curiae of the Lawyers Co-Operative Publishing Co. at 11-12,
Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. West Publishing Co., 107 S. Ct. 962 (1987) (No. 86-891)
[hereinafter Lawyers Co-op. Brief Amicus Curiae].
6. West Publishing Co. v. Mead Data Cent., Inc., 616 F. Supp. 1571 (D.
Minn. 1985), affd, 799 F.2d 1219 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 962
(1987). The district court considered four factors in deciding whether to grant
the injunction: (1) the probability of West's success on the merits at trial; (2)
the threat of harm to West resulting from a denial; (3) the balance of this
harm against the harm to Mead if the injunction were granted; and (4) the
public interest in an injunction. See id. at 1575 (citing Dataphase Sys., Inc. v.
C.L. Systems, 640 F.2d 109 (8th Cir. 1981)). The court of appeals adopted the
same standard in determining whether to affirm the district court's decision to
grant the preliminary injunction. See West Publishing Co., 799 F.2d at 1222-23.
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peals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the injunction pending
trial, holding that West would likely succeed in showing that
Mead's addition of star pagination to LEXIS would infringe on
the copyrighted arrangement of cases in West's reporters.7
Awakening the ghosts of a century-old conflict, West's
copyright claim raises the difficult and rarely litigated issue of
copyright protection for page numbers.8 Because copyright
Because both courts discussed the heart of the copyright claim in conjunction
with the first factor, the opinions and this Comment are primarily concerned
with the Eighth Circuit's analysis of West's probable success at trial. See i&L at
1223 (noting that Mead's principal contention was that West would not succeed
on the merits of its claim).
In addition to granting West's motion for a preliminary injunction, the dis-
trict court also denied a motion by Mead to dismiss based on failure to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted. West Publishing Co., 616 F. Supp. at
1575.
7. West Publishing Co., 799 F.2d at 1219. After its affirmation, the
Eighth Circuit returned the case to the district court for trial on the merits.
Anticipating lengthy and complex litigation, on February 18, 1987, the district
court appointed Professor Irving Younger of the University of Minnesota Law
School as special master. Professor Younger will resolve all contested discov-
ery issues, including those raised by the parties' appeals to the district court of
the decisions of the United States Magistrate.
In the meantime, Mead petitioned the United States Supreme Court for
certiorari review of the Eighth Circuit's decision. Lawyers Co-operative Pub-
lishing Company submitted an amicus curiae brief, arguing against West.
Lawyers Co-op. Brief Amicus Curiae, supra note 5, at 2. See also infra note
155 (discussing the reasons for Lawyers Co-operative's intervention). Despite
Lawyers Co-operative's intervention, the Supreme Court denied review. Mead
Data Cent., Inc. v. West Publishing Co., cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 962 (1987).
The Eighth Circuit's discussion of the merits of the copyright claim is not
technically binding on the subsequent trial court because a full record had not
been developed before the appellate review of the preliminary injunction. See
West Publishing Co., 799 F.2d at 1227 (court's holding subject to reexamination
after the record has closed); see also i. at 1229 ("The District Court's findings,
and our observations as to the governing law made in this opinion, are tenta-
tive and provisional, in the sense that different findings or conclusions might
be warranted after a trial on the merits." (citing Independent Fed'n of Flight
Attendants v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 655 F.2d 155, 159 (8th Cir. 1981)).
Nevertheless, although new facts may enhance the record, they are not likely
to persuade the district court to challenge the appellate court's broadly stated
analysis and conclusive holdings. See West Publishing Co., 799 F.2d at 1231-32(Oliver, J., dissenting in part) (criticizing the extent of the majority's com-
ments on the merits under an abuse of discretion review standard).
8. During the legal publishers' wars of the late 1800s and early 1900s, the
issue of copyrighting case arrangement and pagination arose twice. See Calla-
ghan v. Myers, 128 U.S. 617 (1888); Banks Law Publishing Co. v. Lawyers' Co-
op. Publishing Co., 169 F. 386 (2d Cir. 1909). See infra notes 73-88 and accom-
panying text for an analysis of these two cases. Only one court held squarely
on the issue of copyright protection of page numbers. In Banks, the court held
that an official reporter could not copyright the pagination of its law reports.
See Banks Law Publishing Co., 169 F. 386 and infra notes 81-85 and accompa-
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generally requires some degree of creative authorship,9
mechanically assigned page numbers are a suspect candidate for
copyright protection.1 0 In addition, the law's refusal to protect
systems such as a page numbering scheme heightens the suspi-
cion.11 West's claim suffers further complications from the
legal community's dependence on page numbers in citing
volumes of law.12 Failure to protect West's page numbers, how-
ever, may deprive West of the fruit of its substantial labor in
compiling and publishing opinions.
13
nying text for an analysis of this case. The same court later rejected a copy-
right infringement claim based on duplication of the paging of a document in
the public domain. Eggers v. Sun Sales Corp., 263 F. 373 (2d Cir. 1920).
9. See infra note 22 (discussing creativity requirement).
10. See West Publishing Co., 799 F.2d at 1237 (Oliver, J., dissenting in
part) (arguing that mechanically produced page numbers lack originality). Be-
cause copyright law protects only original works of authorship, a court should
require a publisher to demonstrate some originality in its page numbers to ob-
tain a copyright in them. See infra notes 19-23 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the originality requirement); infra notes 50-62 and accompanying text
(discussing originality problems in copyrighting a referencing number system);
infra notes 97-98 and accompanying text (describing the West court's circum-
vention of the originality problem).
Other challenges raised by Mead and the dissenting judge include argu-
ments that page numbers are an uncopyrightable system, see West Publishing
Co., 799 F.2d at 1228; that page numbers are uncopyrightable facts, see id; and
that page numbers are not original works of authorship, see id at 1237 (Oliver,
J., dissenting in part). See also infra note 101 (discussing the court's responses
to Mead's and the dissenting judge's arguments).
11. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982) (copyright protection does not extend to
ideas or systems). See also infra text accompanying notes 29-32 (discussing
courts' refusal to give copyright protection to ideas); infra text accompanying
notes 128-32 (refuting the idea/expression challenge to West's claim).
12. Page numbers are essential in legal writing to provide specific cita-
tions to authority supporting each point of law. See W. STATSKY & R.
WERNET, CASE ANALYSIS AND FUNDAMENTALS OF LEGAL WRITING 549 (1977).
See also BLUE BOOK, supra note 4, at 17; M. PRiCE, H. BrrNER & S. BYsIEWIcz,
supra note 4, at 500. Legal citations normally include the volume name and
number, and page numbers locating the material within a volume. See BLUE
BOOK, supra note 4, at 15, 17, 44; W. STATSKY & R. WERNET, supra, at 27.
13. The primary goal of copyright law is to ensure that the public benefits
from creative efforts. See infra notes 17 & 18. To achieve this goal, copyright
law must to some degree reward the creator. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Univer-
sal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) (stating that monopoly privileges
of copyright are a means to motivate creative efforts for the ultimate benefit
of the public); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1953) ("The economic philoso-
phy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is
the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the
best way to advance public welfare .... Sacrificial days devoted to such crea-
tive activities deserve rewards commensurate with the services rendered.");
see also infra note 17 (citing cases discussing copyright law's purposes); see
generally 1 M. NIMmER, NImmER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.03[A] (1986) (discussing the
necessity of the copyright monopoly for the full realization of creative activi-
[Vol. 71:991
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This Comment analyzes the Eighth Circuit's decision that
West would likely succeed at trial in protecting its page num-
bers. Part I discusses the principles relevant to the copyright of
reference works14 and summarizes the limited case law specifi-
ties). West's claim rests heavily on the presumption that LEXIS's star pagina-
tion feature will reduce the legal community's need to buy West's hardbound
reporters and thus destroy West's reward for its publishing efforts. See infra
note 112 (noting the West court's concern for the market effect); infra notes
146-47 (discussing the probability of star pagination's market effect on West's
reporters).
Considering the computer's advantage in speed, economy of space, and
flexibility, perhaps the replacement of hardbound reporters by computers is
ultimately inevitable regardless of star pagination. If so, West may only delay
the loss of its reporter market. Before relying on the irresistable attraction of
computers, however, a prognosticator should consider the strength of anti-
computer bias. In a scene from a Star Trek episode, Captain Kirk faced a
court-martial for culpable negligence. His attorney, whom Kirk had not yet
met, had moved into Kirk's apartment, accompanied by stacks of law books(looking suspiciously like West volumes). As Kirk enters his apartment, he
complains about the clutter. The following dialogue ensues:
Attorney: What's the matter, don't you like books?
Kirk: Oh, I like them fine, but a computer takes less space.
Attorney: A computer, eh? I got one of these in my office [shows
computer terminal to Kirk]; contains all the precedents, the synthesis
of all the great legal decisions written throughout time. Ugh! I never
use it.
Kirk: Why not?
Attorney: I got my own system. Books, young man, books.
Thousands of them. If time wasn't so important, I'd show you some-
thing- my library, thousands of books.
Kirk: What would be the point?
Attorney: This is where the law is, not in that homogenized, pas-
teurized, synthesized .... Do you want to know the law, the ancient
concepts in their own language, learn the intent of the men who
wrote them, from Moses to the Tribunal of Alpha III? Books.
Kirk: You have to be either an obsessive crackpot who's escaped
from his keeper or Samuel T. Cogley, Attorney-at-Law.
Attorney: Right on both counts.
Star Trek Court-Martial (television broadcast Feb. 2, 1967) (available on
videocassette distributed by Paramount Pictures, Corp.). No doubt many
twentieth-century practitioners who share a philosophy similar to Mr. Cogley's
will keep West and other hardbound reporter publishers in business for some
time.
14. For the purposes of this Comment, a reference work is one that lo-
cates information. A reference work may refer the user to another publica-
tion. Indexes and bibliographies are examples of this type of reference work.
A second type of reference work contains locatable information in itself. The
information in a law reporter or version of the Bible, for example, is intended
to be referenced by citations to those volumes. The latter type of reference
work differs from ordinary repositories of information, such as newspapers,
because the ability to reference the work is a primary purpose in its publica-
tion. This Comment contends that a law reporter is a reference work whose
copyright should be judged accordingly.
1987]
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cally addressing copyright in case arrangement and pagination
of law reporters. Part II describes and critiques the Eighth Cir-
cuit's reasoning in West and offers an alternative basis for pro-
tecting West's page numbers. The Comment concludes that
although the Eighth Circuit's dependence on an original case
arrangement is misplaced, copyright law nevertheless offers
limited protection for citations to reference works such as
West's law reporters.
I. COPYRIGHT PROTECTION FOR
A REFERENCE WORK
A. THE PRINCIPLES GOVERNING COPYRIGHT IN
A REFERENCE WORK
A reference work's copyrightability is subject to certain
fundamental principles. Copyright law recognizes that society
benefits from the encouragement of creative activity.' 5 The law
therefore rewards the effort of creating a beneficial new work
by granting control over use of the work to the creator.16 The
creator's exclusive rights, however, must not utterly deprive
the public of the benefit of the new creation.' 7 Thus, copyright
law should set a level of protection that sufficiently encourages
creative endeavors while simultaneously ensuring some public
access to the creation's benefits.' 8
15. See Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932) ("The sole inter-
est of the United States and the primary object in conferring the [copyright]
monopoly lie in the general benefits derived by the public from the labors of
authors."). To pursue this goal, the Constitution grants Congress the power to
"promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts," and Congress is instructed
to do so "by securing... to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
16. The law secures certain rights for the creator by providing the incen-
tive necessary for individual creative effort and thus promotes the intended
progress of science and the arts. See supra note 13. The result is a limited
copyright monopoly as a necessary condition to the full realization of creative
activities. 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 13, § 1.03[A], at 1-32. The owner's rights
include exclusive control over reproduction, publication, and dissemination.
See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982).
17. Copyright law justifies the creator's monopoly as a means to benefit
the public, not the individual creator. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 n.10 (1984) (Copyright legislation "'is not based
upon any natural right that the author has in his writings.... but upon the
ground that the welfare of the public will be served .... '" (quoting H.R. REP.
No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1909))); National Business Lists, Inc. v. Dun &
Bradstreet, Inc., 552 F. Supp. 89, 91-92 (N.D. fli. 1982) (stating that the copy-
right act was enacted to further the public interest and not the interests of
those seeking to profit from their intellectual properties).
18. In Sony Corp. of Arm, the Supreme Court stated:
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A reference work's copyrightability is governed by doc-
trines developed to provide both creative reward and public ac-
cess to the work. Foremost among these doctrines is the
originality requirement.1 9 Statutory copyright protection ex-
tends only to "original works of authorship. '20 The law thus
establishes originality as the dividing line between protected
and unprotected works.21 Under traditional copyright doctrine,
a work must not only be more than a copy of an existing work,
it must also evidence some creativity to meet the originality re-
quirement.22 A creator, however, need show very little creative
"In enacting a copyright law Congress must consider... two ques-
tions: First, how much will the legislation stimulate the producer and
so benefit the public; and, second, how much will the monopoly
granted be detrimental to the public? The granting of such exclusive
rights, under the proper terms and conditions, confers a benefit upon
the public that outweighs the evils of the temporary monopoly."
464 U.S. at 429 n.10 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1909)).
See Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157,
1163 (9th Cir. 1977) (recognizing the competing social interests of rewarding an
individual's creativity and permitting use of the benefits of the creation).
A creator's monopoly over ideas or creations may destroy the use of those
ideas or the ability of future creators to build upon them. See Morrissey v.
Procter & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675, 678 (1st Cir. 1967) (stating that copyright
might "exhaust all possibilities of future use of the substance"); Crume v. Pa-
cific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 140 F.2d 182, 183 (7th Cir.) (stating that copyright may
frustrate the dissemination of scientific and useful knowledge), cert denied,
322 U.S. 755 (1944). Nimmer argues that a copyright monopoly is unjustified if
it does not benefit the public. 1 M. NImMER, supra note 13, § 1.03[A], at 1-32.
As a result, courts should award copyright protection only when the monopoly
will result in sufficient public benefit.
19. See Kamar Int'l v. Russ Berrie & Co., 657 F.2d 1059, 1061 (9th Cir.
1981) ("originality is the sine qua non of copyrightability"); 1 M. Nmsap,
supra note 13, § 2.01, at 2-5 (originality is the "one pervading element prereq-
uisite to copyright protection").
20. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982) ("Copyright protection subsists... in original
works of authorship .... ).
21. The statutory phrase actually requires not just originality but also au-
thorship. See supra note 20. Authorship, however, blends into originality be-
cause an author is simply "'he to whom anything owes its origin; originator;
maker."' Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884) (at-
tributing quote to Worcester); see also 1 M. NnMER, supra note 13, § 1.06[A],
at 1-37 ("Originality... may be said to be the essence of authorship.").
22. Originality encompasses both a prohibition against copying an existing
work, see Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 103 (2d Cir.
1951); 1 M. NII=4, supra note 13, § 2.01[A] and cases cited therein, and a re-
quirement of some degree of intellectual thought, labor, or creativity, see, e.g.,
Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 561 (1972) (the writings of an author may
be "the fruits of creative intellectual or aesthetic labor"); The Trade-mark
Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879) (writings are protected only if they are "founded
in the creative powers of the mind" and "the fruits of intellectual labor"); Duff
v. Kansas City Star Co., 299 F.2d 320, 323 n.2 (8th Cir. 1962) (work must be
"the product of the mind and genius of the author" (quoting 2 H. NIMS, UN-
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effort or variation from existing works to obtain copyright priv-
ileges. 23 This low threshold2 is justified by the limited protec-
FAIR CompETrIoN AND TRADEMARKS § 272, at 889 (4th ed. 1947))); see also 1
M. NnMER, supra note 13, § 1.06[A], at 1-37 ("[O]riginality itself must exhibit
a modicum of intellectual labor in order to constitute the product of an au-
thor.") and cases cited therein; see generally Denicola, Copyright in Collections
of Facts: A Theory for the Protection of Nonfiction Literary Works, 81
COLUM. L. REV. 516, 521-22 (1981) (discussing the creativity requirement and
copyrights in compilations of facts). Courts generally treat these requirements
interchangeably. 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 13, § 1.08[C][1], at 1-48. But see i&.
§ 2.01[B], at 2-13 (greater clarity of expression results if originality and creativ-
ity are considered as separate elements); accord Denicola, supra, at 521 n.28 (it
may be more efficient to restrict the idea of originality to copying and to con-
sider creative intellectual effort separately). The West court adopted Nim-
mer's distinction by requiring both intellectual effort and originality. See West
Publishing Co. v. Mead Data Cent., Inc., 799 F.2d 1223, 1227 (8th Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 962 (1987). See also infra note 98 (providing a fuller
description of the Eighth Circuit's analysis).
23. See Alfred Bell & Co., 191 F.2d at 102-03 (describing originality as little
more than a prohibition of actual copying (citing Hoague-Sprague Corp. v.
Frank C. Meyer, Inc., 31 F.2d 583, 586 (E.D.N.Y. 1929))); 1 M. NIMMER, supra
note 13, § 1.08[C][1], at 1-49 (discussing the creativity requirement, stating that
"almost any ingenuity in selection, combination or expression, no matter how
crude, humble or obvious, will be sufficient to render the work a writing").
24. See L. Batlin & Son v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 490 (2d Cir.) ("The test of
originality is concededly one with a low threshold .... "), cert denied, 429 U.S.
857 (1976). Courts occasionally inject some bite into the otherwise low thresh-
old of originality. Drawing on the prohibition against copying, some courts re-
ject merely trivial variations. For instance, after conceding the low threshold
of originality, the court in L. Batlin & Son rejected the use of a different me-
dium in an art reproduction as a trivial variation. Id. at 491. See also Grove
Press, Inc. v. Collectors Publication, Inc., 264 F. Supp. 603, 605 (C.D. Cal. 1967)
(plaintiff's correction of 40,000 grammatical, punctuation, spelling, and typo-
graphical errors in public domain document were too trivial for copyright).
Other courts require a "modest" degree of originality. See, e.g., Durham In-
dus., Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905, 911 (2d Cir. 1980) (rejecting distinction
in toys as less than a "modest degree of originality"); Chamberlin v. Uris Sales
Corp., 150 F.2d 512, 513 (2d Cir. 1945) (stating that work must contain some
substantial, not merely trivial, originality). Stricter originality standards may
also flow from the creativity requirement. See, e.g., L. Batlin & Son, 536 F.2d
at 491-92 (rejecting copyright in a plastic duplication of metal bank because it
lacked artistic skill and substantial variation from the original).
An intensified originality examination may be more or less likely depend-
ing on the type of work involved. For example, courts require a higher level
of originality for reproductions of art works, see Durham Indus., Inc., 630 F.2d
905; L. Batlin & Son, 536 F.2d 486, legal and business forms, see Donald v.
Uarco Business Forms, 478 F.2d 764 (8th Cir. 1973); M.M. Business Forms
Corp. v. Uarco, Inc., 472 F.2d 1137 (6th Cir. 1973), or elements of maps, see
Rockford Map Publishers, Inc. v. Directory Serv. Co. of Colo., 768 F.2d 145
(7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 806 (1986); United States v. Hamilton,
583 F.2d 448 (9th Cir. 1978); Christianson v. West Publishing Co., 149 F.2d 202
(9th Cir. 1945). On the other hand, telephone directories and other compila-
tions of facts need little originality. See infra notes 40-41 and accompanying
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tion afforded by copyright.2 5 For example, copyright protection
is limited to the original contributions to the work,2 6 to the ex-
pression of the work and not its underlying idea,2 7 and to the
prevention of only substantially similar, unfair uses. 28
Two limitations on copyright protection, the idea /expres-
sion and fair use doctrines, are particularly relevant to refer-
ence works. The idea/expression distinction allows a creator to
protect only the particular expression of an idea, not the idea
itself.29 The idea thus remains available for others' use.30 De-
spite difficulty in distinguishing ideas from their expressions,3 1
text (discussing copyright of fact compilations). The originality requirement is
more likely to be weakened when a work lacking creativity nevertheless ex-
hibits usefulness worth protecting. See Denicola, supra note 22, at 521-22; in-
fra note 41.
25. See Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 741
(9th Cir. 1971) ("A copyright affords little protection."); Olson, Copyright Orig-
inality, 48 Mo. L. REV. 29, 34, 61 (1983) (Because "[c]opyright is a severely lim-
ited form of protection," the grant of a copyright should not be strenuously
contested.). See also B. KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 44 (1967)
("With the originality concept correctly installed as central, copyright ap-
peared as relatively easy to achieve but as correspondingly modest in its
pretensions to monopoly.").
26. See 17 U.S.C. § 103(b) (1982) ("The copyright in a compilation or deriv-
ative work extends only to the material contributed by the author of such a
work, as distinguished from the preexisiting material employed in the work,
and does not imply an exclusive right in the preexisting material.").
27. See infra notes 29-32 and accompanying text (discussing the prohibi-
tion on copyrighting ideas).
28. See infra notes 35-38 and accompanying text (discussing the fair use
defense). See generally Denicola, supra note 22, at 522-24 (discussing the limi-
tations on the protection that results from acquiring a copyright).
29. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217-18 (1954); Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S.
99, 102-03 (1879); Toro Co. v. R & R Prods. Co., 787 F.2d 1208, 1212 (8th Cir.
1986); Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d
1157, 1163 (9th Cir. 1977); E.F. Johnson Co. v. Uniden Corp. of Am., 623 F.
Supp. 1485, 1500 (D. Minn. 1985); see 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982) ("In no case does
copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea,
procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discov-
ery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or
embodied in such work.").
30. For example, in Atari, Inc. v. Amusement World, Inc, the court al-
lowed a software designer to copyright a specific video game involving a space
ship fighting asteroids, but not the idea of a video game involving space ships
fighting asteroids. 547 F. Supp. 222, 226-27 (D. Md. 1981).
31. So difficult is this distinction that some courts have abandoned the
search for a principled dividing line between idea and expression, settling in-
stead for ad hoc determinations. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Com-
puter Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1253 (3d Cir. 1983) ("Many of the courts which have
sought to draw the line between an idea and expression have found difficulty
in articulating where it falls."), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984); Peter Pan
Fabrics v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960) (L. Hand, J.)
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courts do not hesitate to restrict the subject matter of copyright
by preventing the protection of ideas.
32
Rather than narrowing the subject matter of copyright, the
fair use doctrine restricts the copyright owner's ability to pre-
vent the public's use of the work. The owner of a valid copy-
right may prevent any copying of the protected work that
constitutes an impermissible infringement. 33 Infringement may
be demonstrated if the creator of the second work had access to
the first and the two works are substantially similar.34 The cre-
ator's right to prevent an infringing use, however, is weakened
by the public's right to fair use of the work.35 Statutory criteria
guide the determination of whether a use of a copyrighted work
(declaring that no principle can be stated that will divide idea and expression,
necessitating ad hoc decisions). For an attempt to formulate a test, see Judge
Learned Hand's "abstraction test" in Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45
F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930). Unfortunately, these ad hoc determinations often
deteriorate into unreasoned statements of the result. See, e.g., Herbert Rosen-
thal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 742 (9th Cir. 1971).
32. See, e.g., Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 105-06 (1879) (granting or al-
lowing copyright protection for bookkeeping forms would prevent the public's
ability to use the idea of the creator's bookkeeping system); Eden Toys v. Mar-
shall Field & Co., 675 F.2d 498, 500 (2d Cir. 1982) (common aspects of a toy
snowman were not copyrightable because they are the idea of a snowman, not
the expression of that idea); Brief English Sys. v. Owen, 48 F.2d 555, 556 (2d
Cir. 1931) (denying copyright in a system of shorthand notation because it was
the idea of the creator, not the expression of that idea); Signo Trading Int'l
Ltd. v. Gordon, 535 F. Supp. 362, 364-65 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (citing Brief English
Sys., the court denied copyright in a method of transliterating Arabic words).
33. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982) (listing the five fundamental rights of a copy-
right owner to control the use of the copyrighted work, including the exclusive
right to reproduce the copyrighted work, to prepare derivative works based on
the copyrighted work, to distribute copies to the public by sale, rent, lease or
lending, to perform the copyrighted work publicly, and to display the work
publicly). See also 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 13, § 13.01[A], at 13-4 (identifying
the first element of an infringement action as that of copyright ownership,
which includes proof of originality and copyrightability of the subject matter).
34. 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 13, § 13.01[B], at 13-6 ("[C]opying is ordina-
rily established indirectly by the plaintiff's proof of access and substantial sim-
ilarity."). See Central Tel. Co. v. Johnson Publishing Co., 526 F. Supp. 838, 843
(D. Colo. 1981) (copying for infringement purposes may be shown by proving
access to the telephone directory and substantial similarity between the plain-
tiff's and defendant's works).
35. Fair use is the "'privilege in others than the owner of a copyright to
use the copyrighted material in a reasonable manner without [the owner's]
consent... .' " Rosemont Enters. v. Random House, 366 F.2d 303, 306 (2d Cir.
1966) (quoting H. BALL, COPYRIGHT AND LITERARY PROPERTY 260 (1944)), cerat
denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967). Fair use is an equitable weapon wielded by courts
to "avoid rigid application of the copyright statute when, on occasion, it would
stifle the very creativity which that law is designed to foster." Iowa State
Univ. Research Found. v. American Broadcasting Cos., 621 F.2d 57, 60 (2d Cir.
1980). The fair use defense is codified in 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982). See Harper &
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is fair.36 The most important criterion, the effect of the copy on
the original's market,37 presumes an unfair use if the appropri-
ating work performs the same function as the copyrighted work
and thus potentially erodes its market.3 8
Along with other copyright principles, 39 originality, the
idea/expression doctrine, and the fair use defense determine
the scope of copyright protection. Like most areas of law, how-
ever, copyright has aberrant categories that defy the law's gov-
erning doctrines. Among these categories is the class of works
consisting of compilations of facts, which lack even the minimal
creativity required for originality.40 Departing from the tradi-
Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985) (stating that the
common law is codified in the statute).
36. Those criteria include:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether
such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational pur-
poses;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation
to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value
of the copyrighted work.
17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982).
37. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., 471 U.S. 539 (market effect is "un-
doubtedly the single most important element of fair use").
38. Every commercial use of copyrighted material is presumptively an un-
fair exploitation. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S.
417, 451 (1984). See also Marcus v. Rowley, 695 F.2d 1171, 1177 (9th Cir. 1983)
(" '[A] use which supplants any part of the normal market for a copyrighted
work would ordinarily be considered an infringement."' (quoting H.R. REP.
No. 83, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 33 (1967))). Cf Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Moral
Majority, Inc., 796 F.2d 1148, 1153, 1155-56 (1986) (stating that presumption
that commercial use of copyrighted material is an unfair exploitation may be
rebutted by public interest in allowing an individual to defend self against de-
rogatory personal attacks, at least where effect on marketability is negligible).
The commercial use, however, must perform the same function as the original,
not just occupy the same medium. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Showcase
Atlanta Coop. Prods., 479 F. Supp. 351, 361 (N.D. Ga. 1979). See also 3 M. NIM-
mR, supra note 13, § 13.05[B], at 13-84 (In determining market effect under
fair use, the court must compare the function of each work regardless of its
medium.). A function-usurping work is not a fair use because it is likely to
harm the original's market. Metro-Goldwyn-M1ayer, Inc., 479 F. Supp. at 360-
61.
39. Because they are less relevant to the West case, the other controlling
doctrines of copyright law are not discussed in this Comment. For a brief
overview of copyright law, see B. KAPLAN, supra note 25.
40. The statute defines a compilation as "a work formed by the collection
and assembling of preexisting materials or of data that are selected, coordi-
nated, or arranged in such a way that the resulting work as a whole consti-
tutes an original work of authorship." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982). Compilations
are copyrightable if the compiler's contributions to the preexisting material
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tional creativity requirement, courts search for an alternative
are sufficiently original. See Hutchinson Tel. Co. v. Fronteer Directory Co.,
770 F.2d 128, 131-32 (8th Cir. 1985) (holding alternatively that a telephone di-
rectory's compilation of names and numbers is copyrightable as an original
compilation because of the publisher's original efforts in gathering, sorting,
and maintaining the information); Schroeder v. William Morrow & Co., 566
F.2d 3, 5 (7th Cir. 1977) (original compilation of names and addresses is copy-
rightable); Quinto v. Legal Times of Washington, Inc., 506 F. Supp. 554, 559
(D.D.C. 1981) (newspaper reporter could copyright his original collection of
student interviews). Some original contributions to a compilation, however,
may be too trivial for copyright. See, e.g., L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536
F.2d 486, 490-92 (2d Cir.) (change of medium for art work), cert denied, 429
U.S. 857 (1976); Grove Press, Inc. v. Collectors Publication, Inc., 264 F. Supp.
603, 605-06 (C.D. Cal. 1967) (40,000 language corrections in public domain docu-
ment); Hengst v. Early & Daniel Co., 59 F. Supp. 8, 10 (S.D. Ohio 1945) (chang-
ing a vertical fact table to a horizontal one); see generally 1 M. NIMMER, supra
note 13, § 3.03, at 3-11 to -12 (listing types of contributions to preexisting works
found by courts to be too trivial for an original work). Nimmer includes two
pagination cases in this category, Eggers v. Sun Sales Corp., 263 F. 373 (2d Cir.
1920), and Banks Law Publishing Co. v. Lawyers' Co-op. Publishing Co., 169 F.
386 (2d Cir. 1909). Nimmer then contrasts these cases with the district court's
decision in West Publishing Co. v. Mead Data Cent., Inc., 616 F. Supp. 1571 (D.
Minn. 1985), affd, 799 F.2d 1219 (8th Cir. 1986), cert denied, 107 S. Ct. 962
(1987), concluding that, unlike the earlier pagination cases, the West court
found a change in pagination sufficiently original for copyright. 1 M. NIMMER,
supra note 13, § 3.03, at 3-11 n.11. See infra notes 81-85 and accompanying text
(discussing the Banks case); infra notes 92-96 (discussing the West appellate
court's reading of Banks and its position on pagination originality).
Compilations of facts approach the trivial category but usually survive
originality analysis. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471
U.S. 539 (1985) ("Creation of a nonfiction work, even a compilation of pure
fact, entails originality."). For example, telephone directories suffer original-
ity anemia. Although usually not copied from any other work, directories in-
volve very little of the creative intellectual effort that is traditionally required
for originality. See supra note 22 (discussing the intellectual effort require-
ment). Neither the selection nor the arrangement of a directory's data meets
even a minimal originality standard because both are dictated by circum-
stances. The selection of names is dictated by the corpus of telephone owners
within a given area. See New York Times Co. v. Roxbury Data Interface, Inc.,
434 F. Supp. 217, 222 n.2 (D.N.J. 1977) ("[T]he compilation of a telephone di-
rectory requires the compiler only to ascertain the fact of telephone sub-
scribership; the compiler is not required to make any significant subjective
judgment [in the selection of material]."). The arrangement of names is dic-
tated by the alphabet. See Cooling Sys. & Flexibles, Inc. v. Stuart Radiator,
Inc., 777 F.2d 485, 492 (9th Cir. 1985) ("Obviously an alphabetical list is not a
protectible form of arranging proper names."). Elements dictated by circum-
stances do not have sufficient originality for copyright. Dow Jones & Co. v.
Board of Trade of Chicago, 546 F. Supp. 113, 116 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). In spite of
the lack of originality, directories are nevertheless copyrightable. See Hutch-
inson Tel Co., 770 F.2d at 131 (noting that in passing the 1976 copyright stat-
ute, Congress ratified an unbroken line of cases holding telephone directories
to be copyrightable) and list of cases cited therein.
Courts are often as generous to other compilations of facts. See, e.g.,
Schroeder v. William Morrow & Co., 566 F.2d 3 (7th Cir. 1977) (directory of
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basis of originality, such as the selection or arrangement of
data, to justify copyright protection for these works.41
gardening supplies); List Publishing Co. v. Keller, 30 F. 772 (C.C.S.D.N.Y.
1887) (social register); Dow Jones & Co., 546 F. Supp. 113 (stock index); Na-
tional Business Lists, Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 552 F. Supp. 89 (N.D. Ill.
1982) (compilation of credit information).
41. See, e.g., Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 650 F.2d 1365, 1369-70
(5th Cir. 1981) (copyright in a fact compilation protects the selection and ar-
rangement of data); Keller, 30 F. at 773 (a social directory was original to the
extent that the selection of names was original). Because the selection and ar-
rangement of most fact compilations are dictated by circumstances, see supra
note 40, judicial reliance on these elements amounts to little more than a tech-
nical excuse for an equitable copyright. See National Business Lists, Inc., 552
F. Supp. at 92-93 (Protection of the fruit of compilations of facts is "a doctrine
in search of conceptual underpinnings," but courts have nevertheless protected
the compilers' labors.). One commentator argues that the attitudes of these
courts toward property and unjust enrichment produce an expansive interpre-
tation of authorship in compilations to protect the fruits of diligence and per-
severance. See Denicola, supra note 22, at 520. See also National Business
Lists, Inc., 552 F. Supp. at 92 (compilations of facts deserve copyright because
of their value in collecting data that would not otherwise be available). An-
other analyst suggests that factual work copyright derives from the inability of
early courts to pare these works out of the all-inclusive statutory protection of
"books," coupled with the absence of any other type of protection for them. B.
KAPLAN, supra note 25, at 58.
Struggling with the originality problem, some courts protect the industri-
ousness of the compiler of a directory. See, e.g., Schroeder, 566 F.2d at 5 (hold-
ing that an original directory of gardening supplies was copyrightable because
"only 'industrious collection"' is required for copyright (citing Jeweler's Cir-
cular Publishing Co. v. Keystone Publishing Co., 281 F. 83, 87-88 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 259 U.S. 581 (1922))); Leon v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 91 F.2d 484, 485-86
(9th Cir. 1937) (directory deserved copyright because compilation was an ex-
pensive, complicated, well-organized endeavor, requiring skill and ingenuity);
Jeweler's Circular Publishing Co., 281 F. at 92 ("The law of copyright only re-
quires the subsequent compiler to do for himself that which the first compiler
has done." (citing Keller, 30 F. at 773)); Chain Store Business Guide v. Wexler,
79 F. Supp. 726, 728 (S.D.N.Y. 1948) (originality based on labor and expense).
The directory cases thus deviate from the traditional copyright requirement of
intellectual effort.
Some modern courts have stirred controversy by adopting and expanding
this protection of industriousness. See Hutchinson TeL Co., 770 F.2d at 131-32
(efforts of telephone company in compiling and generating the directory estab-
lished it as an original work of authorship); Financial Information, Inc. v.
Moody's Investors Serv., 599 F. Supp. 994, 999 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (protection of
compiler's diligence is essential as the only meaningful protection), remanded
by 751 F.2d 501 (2d Cir. 1984); Rand McNally & Co. v. Fleet Management Sys.,
591 F. Supp. 726, 733 (N.D. IMI. 1983) (factual compilation can be copyrighted if
it rises to some level of effort and industry); National Business Lists, Inc., 552
F. Supp. at 92-95 (after an extensive analysis of industriousness versus origi-
nality theories, the court adopted the former). Cf Denicola, supra note 22, at
527-35 (criticizing the traditional original arrangement basis of copyright for a
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Reference works42 fall within this aberrant class of fact
compilations. Analysis of a reference work copyright begins
with a determination of the subject matter of its copyright.
Although reference work copyright issues are rarely litigated,43
one court recently analyzed the subject in New York Times Co.
v. Roxbury Data Interface, Inc." The New York Times Com-
pany publishes the New York Times Index annually, referenc-
ing articles in the New York Times by alphabetical subject
listings.45 Roxbury published a personal name index to the
New York Times Index, listing alphabetically all names men-
tioned in the latter and giving citations to the Index.46 The
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey
identified the copyrighted subject matter of the New York
Times Index as the correlation between the subject matter of
the index entry and the citation to articles on that subject in
the newspaper.47 To infringe on this copyright, the court rea-
soned, the defendant must copy not merely the indexed subject
or the citation alone, but rather the subject and the citation to-
gether, thus reproducing the copyrighted correlation.48 In this
manner, copyright protected two individually uncopyrightable
compilation of facts and proposing instead a copyright based on the original
collection of data).
The industriousness theory has been severely criticized. See Financial In-
formation, Inc., 751 F.2d at 510 (Newman, J., concurring) (rejecting lower
court's use of industry theory); Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 650 F.2d
1365, 1369 (5th Cir. 1981) (copyright in a directory is properly viewed as resting
on the originality of the selection and arrangement, not industriousness). See
generally 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 13, § 3.04, at 3-18 to -20 (arguing that indus-
triousness cases are incorrect in failing to apply the traditional standard of
originality); Gorman, Copyright Protection for the Collection and Representa-
tion of Facts, 76 HARV. L. REV. 1569, 1582-84 (1963) (discussing varying applica-
tions of copyright policies between factual works and literary or artistic
works). Unless the critics adopt Denicola's collection theory, they face the
choice of resorting to a technical excuse for copyright in these works or elimi-
nating any copyright protection.
42. See supra note 14 (defining reference work).
43. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Roxbury Data Interface, Inc., 434 F.
Supp. 217, 226 (D.N.J. 1977) (noting that copyrights on indexes have generated
little litigation).
44. 434 F. Supp. 217 (D.N.J. 1977).
45. Id. at 218.
46. Id. at 219. Because Roxbury cited to the Index and not directly to the
Times, it avoided competing with the Index and affecting its market. Id. at
223-24.
47. Id. at 220-21. For example, an individual's name together with the ci-
tation to stories about that individual form a copyrightable correlation.
48. Id. at 220.
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items because of their correlation to each other.49 The subject
matter of a reference work's copyright is therefore the correla-
tion between its information and the citations referencing that
information.
With its subject matter identified, a reference work must
survive an originality challenge to be copyrightable. A typical
reference work, like a fact compilation, has insufficient creativ-
ity to justify a copyright.50 Reference works, like fact compila-
tions, however, are valuable because they collect useful
preexisting material.51 Thus, as with fact compilations, courts
should identify an alternative basis of originality in reference
works to justify their copyright, despite their lack of traditional
creativity.52
Copyright of a reference work therefore requires the iden-
tification of some originality in the subject matter of the copy-
right that is an alternative to traditional creativity. In a recent
case, Toro Co. v. R & R Products Co.,53 the Eighth Circuit used
the rationality of a reference work's correlations as a measure
of its originality. The Toro Company randomly assigned identi-
fying numbers to the replacement parts for its lawn care equip-
ment.54 R & R Products sold its own replacement parts for
Toro equipment. R & R's catalog identified its parts with num-
bers identical to Toro's parts numbers except that an "R" pre-
49. I& at 221. Neither a person's name nor a citation to the New York
Times is protected by copyright because both are uncopyrightable facts. To-
gether, however, the name and citation constitute a copyrightable correlation
the elements of which can be copied individually but not together.
50. See supra note 40 (discussing the originality problems of fact compila-
tions). The New York Times Index in Roxbury, for example, used an unorigi-
nal, alphabetical arrangement of subjects and public domain citations to the
New York Times. In spite of the prodigious efforts and costs in compiling the
data, correlating these two uncopyrightable items required no real intellectual
creativity. See Roxbury Data Interface, Inc., 434 F. Supp. at 221. Unless a com-
piler uses a novel arrangement or significant judgment in selecting among
data, a reference work could not survive traditional originality scrutiny. See
id at 222 nn.2 & 3.
51. See supra note 41 (discussing the value of fact compilations apart from
their creativity).
52. See id (discussing court reliance on an alternative basis for originality
in a fact compilation). The Roxbury case provides inferential support for a
similar scrutiny of both fact compilations and reference works. The Roxbury
court likened the index in that case to directories in that both involve copy-
right of correlations. Roxbury Data Interface, Inc., 434 F. Supp. at 222. Be-
cause both reference works and directories have the same type of
copyrightable subject matter, the level of originality scrutiny should be the
same for both.
53. 787 F.2d 1208 (8th Cir. 1986).
54. I& at 1213.
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ceded R & R's numbers.55 Toro claimed a copyright in its parts
numbers that was infringed by R & R's use of Toro's numbers
for its own parts. 56 Rejecting Toro's copyright claim, the
Eighth Circuit concluded that the threshold of originality was
not low enough to sustain a copyright in randomly assigned
parts numbers.57 Instead, the court required a rational 58 pat-
tern in the correlation of the parts and their numbers that
would evidence some effort or content in the assignment of the
numbers.59 Thus, the Toro court based the parts numbers' orig-
inality on the rationality of the correlations of Toro's parts
referencing system.60 Hinging copyright on the rationality of
the reference work's correlations appropriately furthers copy-
right objectives61 by ensuring that any correlational work with
public value will receive copyright protection.62
The copyrightability of rational correlations should not be
55. Toro Co. v. R & R Prods. Co., 600 F. Supp. 400, 400 (D. Minn. 1984),
affd, 787 F.2d 1208 (8th Cir. 1986).
56. Id.
57. Toro Co., 787 F.2d at 1213.
58. The Toro court did not use the word "rational," but the distinction is
evident in the court's reiteration of the inadequacy of a "random" system, con-
trasted with the adequacy of one with a "meaningful pattern." See id. at 1213.
59. Id Although the Eighth Circuit held that Toro's parts numbers
needed a meaningful pattern to be copyrightable, see id., it was apparently
searching for a rational relationship between the numbers and the parts rather
than simply order in the numbers. The court pointed out that "[t]here was no
evidence that a particular series or configuration of numbers denoted a certain
type or category of parts ..... " Id The court thus described a necessary corre-
lation between numbers and parts such that a part number would rationally
identify a certain type of part.
60. In contrast to Toro's system, the correlations in Roxbury were rational
and thus original because they referred users to articles on specific subjects in
the Times. The correlation in Roxbury connected subjects of stories in the
New York Times with citations to the volume, page numbers, and columns
containing stories on those subjects. See New York Times Co. v. Roxbury Data
Interface, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 217, 220 (D.N.J. 1977). A user could be certain that
stories on a subject would be found at the citations correlated to the subject.
This correlation would satisfy the Toro court's search for rationality, because
each indexed subject denoted a certain type of story.
61. See supra notes 17 & 18 and accompanying text (discussing the objec-
tives of copyright law).
62. A reference work that has random, irrational correlations will not
only fail the originality inquiry but will also have no value to the public. For
example, if the New York Times Index correlated subject matter and citations
in a random manner, the user could not locate stories on the subject matter
through the Index. A work with no covetable utility has no need of copyright
protection because no infringer would attempt to appropriate it. The standard
of utility, however, should not be so stringent that it encourages judicial as-
sessment of a work's value. See Olson, supra note 25, at 61 (arguing that
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undermined by an idea/expression attack.63 In addition to its
originality analysis, the Toro court also provided a relevant
idea/expression analysis of a reference work. The district court
in that case relied on the statutory prohibition against copy-
righting ideas or systems64 in holding that Toro could not copy-
right its parts numbering system.65  The Eighth Circuit,
however, reasoned that Toro intended to protect only its spe-
cific parts numbers, not the system or idea of using numbers to
identify parts.66 The appellate court therefore concluded that
the numbers were the manufacturer's expression of an idea and
thus potentially copyrightable.6 7 Under this approach, the
numbers used in a reference work are a copyrightable expres-
sion of the idea of identifying and referencing the associated
information.
Although a reference work's correlations should thus qual-
ify for copyright protection, the fair use defense may restrict
courts should avoid judging the value of a work in assessing its copyright-
ability).
The Toro court may have set its standard of rationality too high to protect
all publicly useful works. By requiring rationality between each element of an
individual correlation, the Toro court endangered some useful works that do
not meet this standard. For instance, a telephone directory's individual corre-
lations have no inherent rationality because the name of a telephone owner
signifies nothing about the type of number that person has. A directory would
thus fail the Toro test. Yet a directory has great public usefulness because the
name-to-number correlations are ordered alphabetically, facilitating location
of a particular person's number. To protect this usefulness, a court should
grant a copyright based on the rationality in the order of the correlations, even
though each individual correlation has no rational relationship.
Under this approach, Toro may have been wrongly decided. Even a ran-
dom assignment of parts numbers has usefulness if those numbers are ar-
ranged in a way that allows a user to locate a part according to its number
(like the ability to locate a number by looking up a name in a telephone direc-
tory). If Toro arranged its random parts numbers in a rational order in a cata-
log, for example, the correlations between the parts numbers and the parts
should be copyrightable. Thus, although the Toro analysis is insightful, that
court's standard may have been too strict to protect all correlational works of
public usefulness.
63. See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text (discussing the
idea/expression dichotomy).
64. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982). See also supra notes 29-32 (discussing
the prohibition on copyrighting ideas or systems).
65. Toro Co. v. R & R Prods. Co., 600 F. Supp. 400, 401 (D. Minn. 1984),
affjd, 787 F.2d 1208 (8th Cir. 1986).
66. Toro Co., 787 F.2d at 1212.
67. Id (although finding the manufacturer's numbers potentially copy-
rightable, the Eighth Circuit rejected Toro's copyright claim based on the parts
numbering system's lack of originality). See supra notes 53-62 and accompany-
ing text (discussing the Toro court's originality analysis).
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the publisher's right to prevent use of its correlations. Works
intended to be cited invite a fair use defense by holding their
copyrighted citations out for public use.68 Although conceding
that general use of its citations is fair, a reference work's pub-
lisher should nevertheless be able to prevent a wholesale usur-
pation of the work's copyrighted subject matter if the usurping
work performs the same function as the original work and po-
tentially affects the original work's market.69 Otherwise, the
incentive to produce reference works diminishes in the face of
a competitor's ability to copy and sell the work's valuable corre-
lations. Use of a copyrighted reference work is therefore fair
only if the use is not a wholesale, competing one.
In sium, under the principles of these cases, the owner of a
reference work copyright may prevent wholesale and competi-
tive use of correlations that are sufficiently rational to serve as
the requisite alternative basis for copyright.
68. The fair use defense should be generously available for the user of a
reference work. A court allowing a fair use does so in spite of the lack of con-
sent to the use by the owner. See Rosemont Enters. v. Random House, 366
F.2d 303, 306 (2d Cir. 1966) (stating that fair use occurs without the owner's
consent), cert denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967). Thus, if a publisher consents to
broad public copying of its material, the fair use defense should be available
for all but the most egregious copying.
Reference works should be subject to broad fair use defenses for two
other reasons as well. Works of diligence such as fact compilations receive less
protection from public use than do works of creativity. New York Times Co.
v. Roxbury Data Interface, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 217, 221 (D.N.J. 1977); see Benny
v. Loew's, Inc., 239 F.2d 532, 536 (9th Cir. 1956) (availability of fair use for com-
pilations, listings, and digests contrasted with that for creative dramatic
works), aff'd by an equally divided Court sub nom. Columbia Broadcasting
Sys. v. Loew's, Inc., 356 U.S. 43 (1958). Similarly, factual works receive less
protection than works of fiction. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation En-
ters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985). As a factual work of diligence, then, a reference
work is subject to both these limitations on the scope of protection.
69. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text (discussing the market
effect limitation on fair use). See also Frank Shephard Co. v. Zachary P. Tay-
lor Publishing Co., 193 F. 991, 992-93 (2d Cir. 1912) (holding a competitor's sub-
stantial duplication of lists of citations an unfair infringement). Shephard
provides analogous support for the right of a reference work's publisher to
prevent wholesale, competitive duplication. Like West, Shephard intended the
data in its volume to be copied and used freely. Nevertheless, the court
granted copyright protection when a user attempted to usurp Shephard's mar-
ket by wholesale duplication of the otherwise freely usable data. See generally
Denicola, supra note 22, at 527-35 (discussing the inability of an author to pre-
vent a wholesale, market-effecting appropriation under the faulty but tradi-
tional arrangement-based copyright for compilations of facts).
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B. CASE ARRANGEMENT AND PAGINATION
COPYRIGHT DECISIONS
In addition to copyright theory, case precedent concerning
law reporter copyright should illuminate the propriety of pro-
tecting page numbers. Unfortunately, American law offers
only two factually similar cases, and both are somewhat dated
and confusing.70 Early copyright decisions secured the public
domain status of judicial opinions themselves by defeating at-
tempts to copyright them.71 Later decisions, however, estab-
lished a publisher's right to copyright its original contributions
to a compilation of judicial opinions.7 2 As the courts focused on
the dividing line between copyrightable original material and
uncopyrightable judicial matter, case arrangement and pagina-
tion came under scrutiny.
70. See Callaghan v. Myers, 128 U.S. 617 (1888); Banks Law Publishing Co.
v. Lawyers' Co-op. Publishing Co., 169 F. 386 (2d Cir. 1909). See infra notes 73-
88 and accompanying text for full discussion. These cases were part of a much
larger confrontation. The mid-1800s to early 1900s witnessed publisher war-
fare as the courts settled the ground rules of the new law reporting industry.
The first skirmishes concerned the rights to judicial opinions and compilations
thereof. See infra note 71. After opinions were judicially anchored in the pub-
lic domain, publishers then clashed over the right to first publication. See, e.g.,
Banks & Bros. v. West Publishing Co., 27 F. 50 (C.C.D. Minn. 1886); Nash v.
Lathrop, 142 Mass. 29, 6 N.E. 859 (1886). Further, as publishers began produc-
ing encyclopedias, digests, and citators for the burgeoning reporters, they liti-
gated the right to appropriate lists of citations. See W.H. Anderson Co. v.
Baldwin Law Publishing Co., 27 F.2d 82 (6th Cir. 1928); Frank Shephard Co. v.
Zachary P. Taylor Co., 193 F. 991 (2d Cir. 1912); West Publishing Co. v. Ed-
ward Thompson Co., 176 F. 833 (2d Cir. 1910). By 1930, with rules in hand,
those publishers still standing apparently shifted their conflicts to the market-
place.
71. See Banks v. Manchester, 128 U.S. 244 (1888); Wheaton v. Peters, 33
U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834); Connecticut v. Gould, 34 F. 319 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1888);
Banks & Bros., 27 F. 50; Gray v. Russell, 10 F. Cas. 1035 (C.C.D. Mass. 1839).
Contra In re Gould, 53 Conn. 415, 2 A. 886 (1885). The Wheaton case set the
cornerstone for law reporter copyright. Peters published a condensed version
of Wheaton's voluminous and expensive Supreme Court reports. Alerted by
his publisher to impending financial disaster from the competition, Wheaton
sued, claiming a copyright in the opinions themselves. Following an emotional
and bitter proceeding, the Court unequivocally held that judicial opinions were
not copyrightable; the need for public access to the laws of the land prevailed
over Wheaton's rights as a publisher. See Joyce, The Rise of the Supreme
Court Reporter: An Institutional Perspective on Marshall Court Ascendancy,
83 MICH. L. REv. 1291 (1985) (providing a detailed history of Wheaton and de-
velopments leading up to it). The copyright statute codifies public access to
government works. See 17 U.S.C. § 105 (1982).
72. See, e.g., Callaghan, 128 U.S. 617 (holding that the official reporter
may copyright its compilation of opinions, including fact summaries, head-
notes, arguments of counsel, title pages, tables of cases, and indexes).
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The issue of copyrighting case arrangement and pagination
first arose in 1888 in Callaghan v. Myers.73 In Callaghan, the
publisher of the official Illinois state reports, Eugene Myers,
claimed copyright in the case arrangement and pagination of
his reporters. 74 In its volume, Callaghan & Company dupli-
cated Myers's arrangement and pagination to avoid confusion in
citation.75 The Supreme Court held that Callaghan infringed
on Myers's copyright in his compilation 7 6 but stopped short of
recognizing a copyright in Myers's arrangement and pagina-
tion.77 Dicta in the Callaghan opinion recognized the copyright-
ability of these aspects, 78 but also stated that the labor required
in arranging and paging law reports is "inconsiderable in it-
self"79 and therefore generally insufficient for copyright.8 0
73. 128 U.S. 617 (1888).
74. Id at 621-22.
75. Id at 660, 662. Callaghan should be commended for its idea of uni-
form citation. Had this idea prevailed, today's practitioners would have the
luxury of a single citation that would locate the opinion in all publications.
Any legal writer who has labored long over parallel citations will appreciate
the value of Callaghan's attempt.
Callaghan also argued that Myers could not claim copyright in the Arabic
numbered paging system and that page numbering is the result of a mechani-
cal process and therefore not the author's work. One hundred years later,
Mead's counsel and the dissenting opinion in West raised substantially the
same arguments. See West Publishing Co. v. Mead Data Cent., Inc., 616 F.
Supp. 1571, 1579 (D. Minn. 1985), affd, 799 F.2d 1219, 1223 (8th Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 107 S. Ct. 962 (1987).
76. Callaghan, 128 U.S. at 647.
77. Because Callaghan also copied many other unquestionably copyrighted
aspects of Myers's reports, such as the tables, headnotes, indexes, and sylla-
buses, the Court did not need to reach a holding on copyright in arrangement
and pagination.
78. Id at 649. The Court stated that the copyrightable work of the re-
porter included not only the title page, table of cases, headnotes, statements of
facts, arguments of counsel, and index, but "comprehends also the order of ar-
rangement of the cases, the division of the reports into volumes, [and] the
numbering and paging of the volumes." Id.
79. Id. at 662. The Court adopted statements by the lower court that the
labor would usually be inconsiderable because the arrangement and paging
may be dictated by circumstances or the will of the printer, reporter, or pub-
lisher. Id at 661-62.
80. Id at 662. This may be a narrow reading of the somewhat confusing
dicta in Callaghan. The West majority, for instance, preferred the broader in-
terpretation that Callaghan "indicates that an original arrangement of opin-
ions is copyrightable whenever it is the product of labor, talent, and
judgment." West Publishing Co., 799 F.2d at 1224. The majority, however,
also admitted that "[t]he teaching of Callaghan . . . does not come through
with unmistakable clarity." Id at 1225. Further, the dissent disagreed sharply
with the majority's interpretation. See id, at 1245 (Oliver, J., dissenting in
part) ("[1]f pagination of a law report had been at issue in [Callaghan], the
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Twenty years later, the second court to consider the issue
expressly denied a publisher's claim of copyright in case ar-
rangement and pagination. In Banks Law Publishing Co. v.
Lawyers' Co-operative Publishing Co., 81  Banks Publishing
sought to prevent star pagination to its official United States
Reports in Lawyers' Co-operative's reporters.8 2 Citing Calla-
ghan, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit held that Banks's status as an official reporter defeated its
copyright claim.8 3 The Second Circuit's reasoning indicates that
although Callaghan supported an official reporter's right to
copyright the arrangement of cases,8 4 the reporter may secure
court would not have hesitated to hold that star pagination in a volume of pub-
lished law reports would not be subject to copyright.").
81. 169 F. 386 (2d Cir. 1909).
82. Id. at 386. The current version of the Lawyers Edition still includes
star pagination to the official United States Reports. If Banks still published
those reports, the West case might encourage Banks to relitigate and reverse
its earlier loss. The United States Reports, however, are now published by the
United States Government Printing Office. The current publishers of volumes
to which West star pages, however, may seek to end West's practice if West
succeeds against Mead, although their official status may intrude. See supra
note 3 (listing other publications to which West star pages).
83. See Banks Law Publishing Co., 169 F. 386. The Second Circuit adopted
the district court judge's opinion per curiam. 1d. at 386, 391. See also West
Publishing Co., 799 F.2d at 1225. Because the federal statute creating Banks's
official position required Banks to publish reports, the court reasoned that
Banks was compelled to arrange cases and number pages in "evident compli-
ance with the proper and faithful discharge of his official duties." Banks Law
Publishing Co., 169 F. at 389-90. The court found that his labor was therefore
insufficient for copyright. 1d. at 389. This holding might be justified if Banks
merely published the cases in some predetermined order that required no ef-
fort or selection. Banks's employee, however, testified that he grouped the
cases with serious consideration by subject matter, deciding judge, importance
of the case, or chronological order. 1d, In comparison, West arranges decisions
based on the type of court, geographic region, subject matter, see West Pub-
lishing Co., 799 F.2d at 1221-22, 1226, and date of decision, see Brief for Appel-
lant app. at A46-A47, West Publishing Co. v. Mead Data Cent., Inc., 799 F.2d
1219 (8th Cir. 1986) (No. 85-5399-MN) [hereinafter Brief for Appellant], cert.
denied, 107 S. Ct. 962 (1987); see also West Publishing Co., 799 F.2d at 1247 (Ol-
iver, J., dissenting in part) (citing West's affidavits regarding its method of
case arrangement). Because West's labor is apparently no greater than was
Banks's, West should not obtain a copyright if it is an official reporter like
Banks, as Mead argued. See id, at 1226. The West court responded by limiting
the definition of an official reporter to one "employed by any State, with a sal-
ary and duties fixed by statute, and with the details of its work controlled by
statute or rule." Id. The adoption by some states of West publications as their
official reporter, see infra note 111, does not reach this level of statutory
employment.
84. The court stated that abundant precedent, including Callaghan, ex-
isted for holding that an official reporter may secure copyright of the arrange-
ment and grouping of cases. Banks Law Publishing Co., 169 F. at 388.
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such a copyright only if the statute creating the reporter's posi-
tion does not require publication of the reports.
8 5
Banks and Callaghan together offer support for a pub-
lisher's copyright in arrangement and pagination, but only
under very limited circumstances.8 6 Even this minimal support
for copyright in case arrangement and pagination is tenuous,
however, because both Banks and Callaghan contain many con-
flicting statements.87 Unfortunately, modern courts have no
Portions of Callaghan do indeed support such a copyright, see Callaghan v.
Myers, 128 U.S. 617, 649 (1888). Other portions, however, contradict this con-
clusion by indicating that the labor involved in arranging and paging a re-
porter is insufficient for copyright, see id. at 661-62. The Banks opinion used
both portions to argue for both propositions. See Banks Law Publishing Co.,
169 F. at 388, 389; see also infra note 85.
85. As support, the Banks court cited Callaghan again, this time to argue
that no law reporter can copyright the arrangement and pagination of its re-
ports. Banks Law Publishing Co., 169 F. at 390 (citing the circuit court dicta
incorporated by the Supreme Court in Callaghan). After citing this passage,
the Banks court concluded that Callaghan would have won if he had copied
only Myers's arrangement and page numbers. The appellate court apparently
interpreted this dicta to imply that those qualities of a reporter are not copy-
rightable. This conclusion is contrary to the court's earlier holding that an of-
ficial reporter "may secure copyright of the ... arrangement or grouping of
cases." See id at 388.
The Banks denial of copyright based on a statutory requirement of publi-
cation effectively precludes an official reporter from obtaining a copyright. It
is highly unlikely that an official reporter will not be required to publish the
reports and thereby have opportunity to copyright the arrangement. Even if
the official reporter is required only to prepare the reports for publication, see
Banks v. Manchester, 128 U.S. 244, 244-54 (1888), preparation would probably
include arranging the cases. Thus, the Banks court left little room for copy-
right by an official reporter. Banks's statute-based denial of copyright conflicts
with a forceful Callaghan holding. The Court in Callaghan stated that "in the
absence of any [statutory] inhibition forbidding [the reporter] to take a copy-
right for that which is the lawful subject of a copyright in him... he is not
deprived of the privilege of taking out a copyright, which would otherwise ex-
ist." Callaghan, 128 U.S. at 647. This "tacit assent" to obtain a copyright must
be affirmatively taken away by statute. See id The statute in Banks con-
tained no affirmative denial of his right to a copyright. See Banks Law Pub-
lishing Co., 169 F. at 387. In spite of the conflict, the Banks court cited the
Callaghan holding extensively. Id at 388.
86. The cases' combined reasoning allows a publisher to obtain a copyright
only if no statute requires publication and the arrangement and pagination are
more original than a typical law report. See text accompanying supra notes
78-80 (discussing Callaghan) and supra notes 83-85 (discussing Banks). But see
supra note 80 (different interpretation of Callaghan).
87. See supra notes 80 & 83-85. The West parties and court of appeals
judges made diligent use of the potential for dispute inherent in Banks and
Callaghan. Much of the argument in briefs and in the majority and dissenting
opinions consisted of great wrangling over Banks and Callaghan. See West
Publishing Co., 799 F.2d at 1219 (majority); id at 1230 (dissent); Brief for Ap-
pellant, supra note 83, at 28-33; Brief for Appellee, supra note 3, at 11, 17-20;
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other factually similar case law because Banks was the last of
the arrangement copyright cases. The unresolved issue of copy-
righting page numbers therefore awaited litigation by the com-
puter generation.88
Reply Brief for Appellant at 8-10, West Publishing Co. v. Mead Data Cent.,
Inc., 799 F.2d 1219 (8th Cir. 1986) (No. 85-5399-MN), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 962
(1987). The district court found these two cases "of particular interest and im-
portance in providing an analytic framework in which to consider the claims
of the parties." West Publishing Co. v. Mead Data Cent., Inc., 616 F. Supp.
1575-76 (D. Minn. 1985), affd, 799 F.2d 1219 (8th Cir. 1986), cert denied, 107 S.
Ct. 962 (1987). Because Banks and Callaghan do not provide any clear, uncon-
tradicted conclusions, however, this Comment suggests that a rational evalua-
tion of copyright purposes in light of current analogous cases-particularly
Toro and Roxbury-will provide a better analytical framework than Callaghan
and Banks. See supra notes 44-49 and accompanying text, notes 53-67 and ac-
companying text, and infra notes 115-133 and accompanying text for the anal-
ysis under Toro and Roxbury. Although a different three-judge panel heard
each case, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals was responsible for both Toro
and West. Presumably because the court did not perceive the relevance of
Toro's numbering system to West's citations, however, the West tribunal made
little use of the Toro holding and no use of its analysis. See West Publishing
Co., 799 F.2d at 1228.
88. In addition to the limited enlightenment provided by Callaghan and
Banks, policy issues surrounding law reporting must be considered in assessing
the copyrightability of a publisher's case arrangement and pagination. Courts
generally are willing to protect the fruit of a creator's labor. See Universal
City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 659 F.2d 963, 965 (9th Cir. 1981) ("the
real purpose of the copyright scheme is ... achieved by reliance on the eco-
nomic incentives granted to authors"), rev'd on other grounds, 464 U.S. 417
(1984). A court facing the issue of law report copyright, however, must con-
sider the desirability of access to judicial opinions. See, e.g., Manchester, 128
U.S. at 253 (judges' whole work, as exposition of binding law, is free for publi-
cation to all); Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 668 (1834) (denying copy-
right in judicial opinions to protect public access to the law). In favoring the
most rapid and efficient dissemination of opinions available, courts have pro-
tected not just some access, but maximum access to opinions. See, e.g., Con-
necticut v. Gould, 34 F. 319, 319 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1888) (stating that public policy
requires the fullest and earliest opportunity of access to opinions); Nash v.
Lathrop, 142 Mass. 29, 6 N.E. 559, 559-61 (1886) (rejecting exclusive right of
first publication in official publisher to allow fullest and earliest access to judi-
cial opinions). West itself won many decisions over access to opinions because
its system was much faster, broader, and more efficient than those of the offi-
cial reporters. See supra note 5.
A copyright in a reporter's page numbers conflicts with the policy favor-
ing broad access to judicial opinions by restricting citation privileges. Calla-
ghan dicta may support denial of page number copyright for this purpose. In
considering Callaghan's copying of Myers's page numbers, the Supreme Court
gave weight to Callaghan's desire to avoid confusion in referencing. See Calla-
ghan, 128 U.S. at 661-62. Thus, in stopping short of granting Myers a copyright
in his page numbers, the Callaghan court may have been concerned over the
efficiency of citing opinions. This maximum access policy may therefore re-
quire the court to weigh the necessity of protecting the publisher's efforts
against any restriction on citation.
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II. COPYRIGHT PROTECTION FOR CITATIONS TO A
LAW REPORTER
A. THE WEST DECISION
In West, West Publishing Company sought to enjoin Mead
Data Central's use of star pagination to refer LEXIS users to
the location of material within a West reporter.8 9 The district
court granted a preliminary injunction, thereby preventing
Mead's use of West's internal page numbers.90 In affirming, the
Eighth Circuit bypassed the quandary of copyrighting page
numbers by protecting West's numbers, whether copyrightable
or not, because they reflected West's copyrighted case arrange-
ment.91 Thus, Mead could not use the page numbers lest it in-
fringe on West's case arrangement.
The court first rejected Mead's contention that Banks and
Callaghan contained a per se rule against copyrighting case ar-
rangement and pagination.9 2 Relying principally on Callaghan,
the court concluded that an original arrangement of opinions is
potentially copyrightable. 93 The West court limited the holding
89. West Publishing Co., 799 F.2d at 1219.
90. Id Because West conceded that LEXIS's inclusion of citations to the
first page of its opinions was a fair use, only Mead's use of internal page num-
bers was at stake. I&d at 1222; West Publishing Co., 616 F. Supp. at 1579.
LEXIS's inclusion of the first page citation is fair only if it does not adversely
affect the market for West's hardbound reporters. See supra notes 35-38 and
accompanying text (discussing fair use defense and market effect). Reasoning
that first page citations would send a researcher to a West book rather than
supplant the use of the book, the district court found no market damage from
first page citations. See West Publishing Co., 616 F. Supp. at 1579; see also J.
KINSoCK, supra note 2, at 55 (arguing that LEXIS's former expensive rates en-
couraged users to print lists of West citations to save computer time and then
use West's books for study). Both courts distinguished use of the internal page
citations as unfair because their availability discouraged the researcher from
using or buying West's books. West Publishing Co., 799 F.2d at 1228; West
Publishing Co., 616 F. Supp. at 1581.
Although probably accurate, the distinction between first page and inter-
nal page citations is less than obvious. LEXIS's use of first page citations prob-
ably reduces the use of West volumes for citations not requiring an internal
cite (for example, when the reference is not to a specific portion of the opin-
ion; see BLUE BOOK, supra note 4, at 17). Further, inclusion of internal cites in
LEXIS may encourage the user to refer to that portion of the opinion in a
West volume. West apparently fears, however, that eliminating the need for
West's reporters for citation purposes is sufficient to affect its market. The lit-
tle evidence produced by either side supports this fear. See infra note 147 (dis-
cussing West's loss of sales due to Mead's announcement of star pagination).
91. West Publishing Co., 799 F.2d at 1223.
92. Id. at 1223-26.
93. Id. at 1223-25. The court generously interpreted Callaghan as indicat-
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in Banks to reporters who are statutorily required to publish.9 4
Further, the court said, Banks required a greater degree of in-
tellectual creativity than either Callaghan or modern cases.95
The court therefore found no per se rule against copyrighting
case arrangement and pagination.96
The Eighth Circuit next examined the copyrightability of
West's case arrangement and pagination. Conceding that the
system of Arabic numbers is not copyrightable, the court rea-
soned that West was not protecting, nor was Mead appropriat-
ing, simple numbers, but rather the underlying case
arrangement.9 7 The court concluded that these underlying ar-
rangements "easily" met the standard of original authorship
and were thus copyrightable because of West's labor, talent,
and judgment in compiling and arranging opinions.98
The Eighth Circuit then found Mead's intended use of the
page numbers an infringement of West's case arrangement in
two ways. First, star pagination would appropriate West's ar-
rangement by allowing a LEXIS user to "page through" an
opinion, find the first page of the next opinion in West, and, by
repeating this process, access West's entire case arrangement.99
ing "that an original arrangement of opinions is copyrightable whenever it is
the product of labor, talent, or judgment." I&. at 1224.
94. Id. at 1225. The court concluded that the "ultimate rationale for the
Banks decision was that while under Callaghan the official reporter could
copyright any material that was the product of his intellectual labor, because
the reporter's statutory duties required case arrangement and pagination,
these should not be considered the product of the reporter's intellectual la-
bor." Id.
95. Id& at 1226.
96. Id.
97. Id- at 1227. The court said that the use of the numbers was sought to
give access to "a large part of what West has spent so much labor and industry
in compiling," thereby reducing the need to buy West's books. Id The key to
the case, said the court, was "not whether numbers are copyrightable, but
whether the copyright on the books as a whole is infringed by the unauthor-
ized appropriation of these particular numbers." Id-
98. Id. at 1226-27. The court appropriately identified both the absence of
copying and intellectual effort strains of originality in its discussion of the law.
Id.; see also supra note 22 (discussing these two strains). In its analysis, the
court of appeals held that West met both standards. West met the "modicum
of intellectual labor" standard because of its labor, talent, and judgment in
compiling cases. West also met the originality standard because it did not copy
any other case arrangement. West Publishing Co., 799 F.2d at 1227. The court
thus upheld the district court's finding that "West's case arrangements, an im-
portant part of which is internal page citations, are original works of author-
ship entitled to copyright protection." Id
99. Id. at 1227. The Eighth Circuit conceded that this usage of LEXIS was
unlikely due to the cost of running a new search with each case. The user
1987] 1017
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
In the alternative, star pagination would usurp West's case ar-
rangement by giving LEXIS users the exact location of any
part of a West case report.10 0 The West court therefore pre-
vented Mead's use of West's page numbers because the pagina-
tion "reflects and expresses West's [copyrighted] arrangement,
and... [Mead's] intended use of West's page numbers infringes
West's copyright in the arrangement."1 0 1
must search for a single case within a volume, page through that case and find
the last page by using star pagination, conduct a new search using the next
page number (the first page number of the next opinion in the West reporter),
and repeat this process for every case in the reporter. Mead unsuccessfully ar-
gued that such a use would be highly unlikely due to the cost of conducting
separate searches for every case in a West volume. The court rejected this ar-
gument because even uneconomical infringing work is still infringing. I- at
1227.
The court might have held simply that the input into LEXIS's data base of
data constituting West's case arrangement amounted to infringement, regard-
less of the user's ability to recall the arrangement. West raised this argument
in its petition to the Supreme Court to deny certiorari. See Brief In Opposition
at 10, Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. West Publishing Co., 107 S. Ct. 962 (1987) (No.
86-891) (denying certiorari). The 1976 Copyright Act defined "copies" to in-
clude any material objects whereby a work may be "perceived, reproduced, or
otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or de-
vice." Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541, 2542 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C.
§ 101 (1982)); see 2 M. NIMmR, supra note 13, § 8.08, at 8-103. Nimmer con-
cludes that this definition "makes clear that the input of a work into a com-
puter results in the making of a copy" that infringes the work's copyright. Id.
at 8-104. When the copyrightable subject matter is data arrangement, how-
ever, Nimmer's conclusion is not justified. Because stored computer data has
no inherent arrangement, the input itself does not necessarily copy the copy-
righted work, the arrangement. Mead has therefore not copied West's ar-
rangement by inputting its page numbers unless LEXIS offers a means to
organize and recall the data into a form that reproduces West's arrangement.
100. West Publishing Co., 799 F.2d at 1227-28. The court held that this ef-
fect of Mead's use would supplant West's market and thus "would ordinarily
be considered an infringement." Id. at 1228 (citing S. REP. No. 473, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess. 65 (1975), quoted in Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters.,
471 U.S. 539, 568 (1985)). Mead might have countered this infringement argu-
ment by claiming that LEXIS does not compete with West's hardbound
volumes, but with WESTLAW. See infra note 146 (discussing narrowly de-
fined market for LEXIS).
101. West Publishing Co., 799 F.2d at 1223. The West court's reasoning
suggests a theory of copyright by association. To find infringement, the court
reasoned that the association of the copyrighted case arrangement with the
page numbers bestowed protection in the otherwise unprotectable numbers.
This theory of copyright by association is almost but not entirely novel. In Fi-
nancial Information, Inc. v. Moody's Inv. Serv., the district court protected
otherwise uncopyrightable daily lists of called bonds because appropriation of
these lists would destroy the copyright in the plaintiff's year-end compilation
of the daily lists. 599 F. Supp. 994, 998 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), remanded by 751 F.2d
501 (2d Cir. 1984). Thus, the uncopyrighted daily lists were protected by their
association with the copyrighted year-end volume. A copyright by association
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B. AN ALTERNATIVE ANALYSIS: PROTECTING A REPORTER'S
CITATION CORRELATIONS RATHER THAN ITS CASE
ARRANGEMENT
West's claim presented the Eighth Circuit with a difficult
analysis. West's reporters are reference works 0 2 and thus simi-
lar to compilations of facts, which do not fit easily into tradi-
tional copyright theory. 0 3 Copyright protection is important
lest works like West's cease to be produced, 0 4 but their lack of
theory has inherent appeal because a legitimate copyright would be useless if
it could be accessed by unrestricted use of associated uncopyrighted material.
See id In order to prevent bogus copyright protection by contrived associa-
tions, however, some limitations must be applied, including a requirement that
the associated copyrighted material surpass triviality. On appeal of Financial
Information, Inc., the Second Circuit pointed out this limitation, remanding
the case for a determination of the triviality of the year-end volume. 751 F.2d
at 507.
Mead also argued that West was attempting to copyright the Arabic num-
bering system. West Publishing Co., 799 F.2d at 1228. The Eighth Circuit held
that the copyright was in the case arrangement, not the numbering system.
Id. Mead further argued that West's citations are statements of fact and there-
fore not copyrightable. Id The court rejected this because Mead's wholesale
use of the factual data exceeded permissible use of a factual compilation. Id
Finally, Mead contended that the public interest in access to the law required
free access to West citations. Id at 1229. The court rejected this argument,
reasoning that the value of a work increased rather than decreased the need
for copyright protection to ensure its publication. Id
The dissenting judge filed a lengthy opinion arguing primarily that the
majority exceeded the proper scope of review in discussing the merits. See id
at 1230, 1232 (Oliver, J., dissenting in part). In addition, the dissent disagreed
with the majority's interpretation of Callaghan and Banks, id at 1239, and
found the record insufficient to grant West's request for a preliminary injunc-
tion. Id at 1233.
102. Law reporters at least partially serve a reference function by provid-
ing a means of locating judicial opinions. See supra note 14 (defining reference
work).
103. Compare supra note 40 (discussing the aberrant nature of compila-
tions of facts and distinctions courts have made in allowing or not allowing
copyright) with infra note 121 (discussing West's reporters' similarity to a
compilation of facts).
104. The assumption that the absence of copyright protection will discour-
age law reporter publication is subject to challenge. On the one hand, court
refusal to protect West's page numbers would allow a rival to duplicate West's
volumes except for the original headnotes and key numbers. Because the legal
profession could use these less expensive imitations to provide West citations,
they would indeed disrupt West's market and possibly discourage West's publi-
cation of reporters. On the other hand, free use of West's page numbers would
encourage publication of reporters by publishers other than West. At present,
these publishers are strongly discouraged from publishing because their
volumes will have little attraction as long as West's reporters dominate cita-
tion practices. Protection of West's numbers therefore actually discourages all
publication but West's. Viewed in this light, the West decision is colored with
1019
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intellectual creativity would ordinarily preclude a copyright.10 5
The West court's difficulties grew out of the troublesome
search for an alternative to traditional creativity that would
justify a copyright.10 6
irony, because West established its dominance through the failure of earlier
courts to provide copyright protection for other publishers. See supra note 5
(citing cases involving denial of copyright and the right to first publication for
publishers opposing West).
On a larger scale, however, page number protection will encourage pro-
duction of reference works in general. Courts should protect the heart of a
reference work, its correlations. See supra notes 42-69 and accompanying text
(discussing copyright for a reference work's correlations). Failure to do so is
tantamount to a refusal to protect such works as indexes and bibliographies,
an unacceptable prospect in light of the protection routinely granted to similar
works such as directories and lists. See supra note 40 (discussing the
copyrightability of fact compilations). Because law reporters are reference
works, see supra note 102, their all-important citation correlations should be
protected. Prospective publishers of reference works will thus be assured that
their substantial compilation efforts will be adequately rewarded. West pro-
duced some evidence that the failure to protect its page numbers would indeed
reduce its hardbound reporter market. See infra note 147. Even within this
larger analysis, however, law reporters continue to rest uneasily because the
legal profession's referencing system, the formalized institution of citation, is
much less amenable to newcomers than other fields of information.
105. See supra notes 40, 50 (discussing originality problems of compilations
of facts and reference works). Like a telephone directory, West's reporters are
basically collections of public domain materials arranged to be accessible to
users.
106. See supra note 41 (discussing other courts' efforts to circumvent the
originality weakness of fact compilations through alternative bases of original-
ity). Although West's claim presents two distinct levels of difficulty, the West
court squarely confronted only one. Because West's page number claim does
not fit neatly into traditional copyright doctrine, see supra note 103 and accom-
panying text, logical extensions of those doctrines do not assist a court in de-
termining the propriety of a copyright. Cases like West's float in the gray area
of copyright law, where equitable and policy considerations should, and usu-
ally do, sway the courts. See supra note 41 (discussing various policy argu-
ments for granting copyright to works like West's). The initial difficulty is
therefore whether equity and policy considerations require that LEXIS be al-
lowed to compete by using West's page numbers or that West should have a
monopoly over its citations. See supra note 104 (analyzing these policy consid-
erations). If this issue is ultimately decided in West's favor, the remaining dif-
ficulty is finding a conceptual basis for protecting page numbers.
The West court made little attempt to analyze the first difficulty, the eq-
uities of granting West protection. Instead, the court assumed that star pagi-
nation would affect West's market, see infra note 112, and would therefore be
unfair. Assuming the equities were in West's favor, the West court then con-
sidered the originality dilemma, relying on the case arrangement for the nec-
essary originality. See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text (describing
the appellate court arrangement-based analysis) and infra notes 109-20 and ac-
companying text (critique of that analysis). The originality problem caused
the court's major difficulties.
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The basis of originality for a reference work copyright de-
pends on the identification of the copyright's subject matter.
West sought and obtained protection of its page numbers be-
cause the numbers reflect West's copyrighted case arrange-
ment. 0 7 According to the West court, this arrangement is the
subject matter of the copyright inquiry.108
Regardless of its copyrightability, however, a law reporter's
case arrangement does not provide a solid foundation for pro-
tecting West's and other publishers' efforts in compiling judicial
opinions. Factually, some West volumes apparently lack the
original arrangement cited by the West court as "easily" meet-
ing the intellectual creativity standard. 09 More importantly,
the research value of West's volumes does not lie in the way
the cases are arranged. 01 To illustrate, if West simply pub-
107. West Publishing Co., 799 F.2d at 1222, 1223.
108. Id. at 1227 ("The key to this case, then, is not whether numbers are
copyrightable, but whether the copyright on the books as a whole is infringed
by the unauthorized appropriation of these particular numbers."). The page
numbers are protected not because they are copyrightable, but because they
are closely associated with the copyrighted case arrangement. This theory of
copyright by association is explored in note 101 supra.
109. Mead included as an addendum to its appellate brief a comparison of
the actual case arrangement in Volume 300 of the Federal Supplement with an
arrangement by date of decision. Although West's editor-in-chief testified that
Federal Supplement advance sheets currently are arranged by date of decision,
see Affidavit of Arnold 0. Ginnow at 7-8, reproduced in Brief for Appellant,
supra note 83, app. at A46-A47, the arrangement in 300 Federal Supplement
does not even minimally conform to a date of decision arrangement. See Brief
for Appellant, supra note 83, Addendum. In response to this challenge, West
replied that this volume predated its current practice of arrangement by date.
See West Publishing Co., 799 F.2d at 1247. Not only did West fail to indicate
what its previous practice was, id., but the arrangement in 300 Federal Supple-
ment defies attempts to discern any rational order. West's failure to show any
original arrangement in this volume raises doubts about the extent of original
arrangement in the rest of its reporter system.
110. In his hornbook on legal research, Professor Morris Cohen nowhere
refers the reader to the value of West's arrangement of cases. Cohen does
state that case reporters' normal chronological arrangement is of little use to a
lawyer, who researches by subject matter. Cohen suggests instead the use of
finding tools, such as West's digests, to locate opinions. M. COHEN & R. BER-
RING, supra note 1, at 3-4, 49, 62, 99-100, 375, 378, 382. Further, West itself dis-
counts the value of its case arrangement for research in its own promotional
literature. In West's Law Finder, intended as a research manual for lawyers,
West does not mention the case arrangement within a volume in its descrip-
tion of the National Reporter System. In touting the value of the key number
digests, it does, however, mention the inadequacy of its case arrangement for
locating material:
Decisions are published approximately in the order in which they
were decided and, therefore, they are not arranged according to legal
subject matter.... Since this is true, it is apparent that the cases on
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lished cases in the order it received them, with no arrangement
whatsoever, Mead would undoubtedly still-attempt to appropri-
ate West's page numbers. With no less doubt, West would still
seek an injunction. The parties are predictably covetous over
page numbers because of the value of the numbers to the legal
community for citation,"'' not because of West's unique case ar-
rangement. Likewise, the court would also desire to protect
West's market even if the arrangements were unoriginal.1
2
any specific point of law are necessarily intermingled among cases de-
ciding other points of law. If only Books of Law were available to the
lawyer, the task of research would be intolerable.
WEST PUBLISHING Co., WEST'S LAW FINDER: A LEGAL RESEARCH MANUAL 13
(rev. 1984). West's case arrangements do have some value. For example, the
breakdown of federal opinions into circuit court and district court volumes and
consolidation of state decisions into regions allows practitioners to selectively
purchase the most appropriate volumes. Further, the grouping of circuit court
opinions by circuit in the Federal Reporter, see, e.g., 787 F.2d (containing two
groups of decisions in order of circuit number in pages 1-675 and 676-1584), en-
ables a user to review all recent decisions of a particular circuit without
searching the entire volume.
Neither of these aspects of West's arrangement is relevant to Mead's usage
of star pagination, however. Mead, in fact, claims no interest in West's case
arrangement. See Brief for Appellant, supra note 83, at 39 ("If there is any
magic to the chronological, Circuit, headnote or other purported 'arrange-
ments of reports' in West-published volumes, West is welcome to them. They
are totally irrelevant and extraneous to LEXIS."). If Mead were interested in
copying West's arrangements, it could use the conceded first page citations to
reproduce West's entire case arrangement (except the internal pages of an in-
dividual opinion) without the use of star pagination. See infra note 138.
111. West publications are by far the most frequently cited legal volumes.
Blue Book requirements illustrate West's value as a source of citations. For
example, the widely-used Blue Book identifies a citation to a West volume as
the only citation for all federal court of appeals and district court decisions
since 1789, BLUE BOOK, supra note 4, at 173-74; as the only citation to the deci-
sions of the highest courts in twenty-one states, id. at 177-216; and as parallel
citations for decisions of the other twenty-nine states, id. In one instance-the
court of claims-West's citations are required instead of those of the official
reporter. Id. at 174. Federal courts likewise depend heavily on West publica-
tions. See D.C. CiR. R. 8(f) (requiring the use of the Federal Reporter for Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit decisions and the National Reporter System for state
decisions); 1ST CIR. R. 11(h) (requiring use of the National Reporter System
for state decisions); 3D CIR. R. 21(1)(A)(i) (requiring the use of the Federal Re-
porter and Federal Supplement for federal decisions and "the West Reporter
system whenever possible" for state); 11TH CIR. R. 22(f)(10) (adopting Blue
Book rules plus the National Reporter System for state decisions). In addition,
a number of states have adopted West's publications as their official reports.
See M. COHEN & R. BERRING, supra note 1, at 24. This widespread acceptance
of citation to West volumes occured slowly, with resistance among the state ju-
diciary continuing into the 1930s. See W. MARVIN, supra note 2, at 65.
112. The West court expressed strong intention to protect West's market.
See West Publishing Co., 799 F.2d at 1227 (access to the internal page numbers
"would give users of LEXIS a large part of what West has spent so much labor
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Court protection of unoriginally arranged volumes is difficult,
however, if the court bases its analysis on an original arrange-
ment.113 The West court's reliance on the irrelevant case ar-
rangement is therefore questionable because the arrangement
is not the appropriate subject matter of the copyright claim.114
Law reporters are valuable not because of their case ar-
rangement, but because they enable legal researchers to access
by citation a comprehensive compilation of cases. 15 To protect
this citation value, the subject matter of West's claim must en-
compass the function of West's page numbers as locators for the
material on a particular page.1 16 Like the index in Roxbury," 7
and industry in compiling, and would pro tanto reduce anyone's need to buy
West's books"); id. at 1228 ("With ... star pagination, consumers would no
longer need to purchase West's reporters to get every aspect of West's arrange-
ment."); id. at 1229 ("MDC's intended use of West's page numbers may signifi-
cantly affect demand for West's volumes .. ").
113. Although the hypothetical in the text highlights the flaws in an ar-
rangement-based analysis, West's actual reporters likewise demonstrate the
futility of such an analysis. The case arrangement in 300 Federal Supplement,
for example, seems to evidence no intellectual effort whatsoever. See supra
note 109. The court's original arrangement analysis cannot protect the ar-
rangement within this volume or any others like it. Other publishers would
fare poorly as well. For example, a review of 229 United States Patent Quar-
terly, published by the Bureau of National Affairs, reveals a completely ran-
dom arrangement of cases, without order as to court, subject matter, or date of
decision. It is doubtful that the West court would allow LEXIS to star page to
this volume but not to West's arranged volumes.
114. Another court recently rejected an arrangement-based copyright in a
similar fact situation. In National Business Lists, Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet,
Inc., 552 F. Supp. 89 (N.D. Ill. 1982), the court rejected the contention that the
protection of a compilation of facts (credit information) was limited to its ar-
rangement of data. Id at 92. Because the compilation in question was not a
reference work, this court did not use correlations as the subject matter, but
relied instead on the collection of information and the industriousness theory.
Id. at 92-95. See supra note 41 (describing collection of data and industrious-
ness theories).
In addition to subject matter problems, the arrangement-based analysis
also caused the Eighth Circuit serious difficulty in describing the nature of
Mead's infringement. See infra notes 135-41 and accompanying text.
115. See supra note 111 (describing the value of West's reporters as sources
of citations).
116. The West court recognized this value in stating, "Communication to
LEXIS users of the location in West's arrangement of specific portions of text
is precisely what the LEXIS Star Pagination Feature is designed to do." The
location of portions of opinions, the court said, "is a large part of the reason
one would purchase West's volumes." West Publishing Co., 799 F.2d at 1228.
The legal community's need for a method of referencing the location of judi-
cial material is satisfied by a citation to a West volume, reporter, and page
number. Id at 1222.
117. See supra notes 44-49 and accompanying text (describing the index in
New York Times Co. v. Roxbury Data Interface, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 217 (D.N.J.
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West's reporters are reference works, whose copyrightable sub-
ject matter is the correlations between the citations and the
material on each page.118 It is these correlations that Mead cov-
ets and West desires to protect.1 1 9 An analysis of West's copy-
right claim should therefore focus on these correlations rather
than on the case arrangement.
120
1977)). See also West Publishing Co. v. Mead Data Cent., Inc., 616 F. Supp.
1571, 1578 n.1 (D. Minn. 1985) (district court comparison of West's self-index-
ing function to the index in Roxbury), affd, 799 F.2d 1219 (8th Cir. 1986), cert
denied, 107 S. Ct. 962 (1987).
118. See Roxbury Data Interface, Inc., 434 F. Supp. at 220-21 (copyrightable
aspect of an index is the correlation between the data referenced and the cita-
tion to the referenced volume). See also supra notes 47-49 and accompanying
text. In addition, Mead's appropriation is precisely aimed not at the case ar-
rangement but at the correlation. See supra note 110 (Mead's denial of inter-
est in West's arrangement).
119. Mead is interested in West's page numbers as locators of judicial mate-
rial, see supra note 116. West's interests are similar, see supra notes 110-14 and
accompanying text (arguing West's desire to protect the page numbers of even
unoriginally arranged volumes).
120. The district court advanced an alternative basis for West's copyright
based on the "self-indexing" nature of a reporter. West Publishing Co., 616 F.
Supp. at 1578. By recognizing the similarity of West's page numbers to an in-
dex (the court compared them to the index in Roxbury), the district court
touched on the correlational nature of the subject matter in West's claim.
The Eighth Circuit in West could have opted for the industriousness the-
ory used by many courts to justify copyright for directories. See supra note 41
(describing the industriousness theory). Under this theory, West's volumes
need no originality for copyright because the effort expended in producing
them suffices regardless of any lack of creativity.
Although the industriousness theory provides a basis for West's copyright,
it inadequately answers the pivotal question concerning which parts of West's
volumes are protected by copyright. Courts using the industriousness theory
prevent the copier from reproducing the creator's work without expending the
same effort. See, e.g., Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Nationwide Indep. Direc-
tory Serv., 371 F. Supp. 900, 906 (W.D. Ark. 1974); accord Northwestern Bell
Tel. Co. v. Bedco, Inc., 501 F. Supp. 299, 302 (D. Minn. 1980). For example, the
court in Jeweler's Circular Publishing Co. v. Keystone Publishing Co. required
the publisher of a competing list of jewelers to canvass the city as did the pub-
lisher of the original volume, rather than copy the latter's list. 281 F. 83, 92
(2d Cir.), cert denied, 259 U.S. 581 (1922). Under this analysis, Mead could not
duplicate West's reporters without similar effort in collecting and arranging
opinions. Mead, however, expended great effort in compiling its data base
from original sources. See Brief for Appellant, supra note 83, at 10-12. It now
wishes to duplicate the page numbering of a West volume. Because placing
page numbers on pages costs West minimal effort, see West Publishing Co., 799
F.2d at 1237 (Oliver, J., dissenting in part) (questioning effort involved in
machine-printing numbers on pages), Mead is not robbing West of its labor in
collecting and arranging opinions without similar expenditure on its own part.
The industriousness theory therefore would not assist the court in identifying
the subject matter of West's copyright or in preventing Mead's infringement.
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C. THE COPYRIGHTABILITY OF A LAW REPORTER'S
CITATION CORRELATIONS
Once the subject matter of the copyright is identified, its
copyrightability must be determined. An emphasis on the cita-
tion correlations alters the issue in West to the originality of
these correlations rather than the originality of the case ar-
rangement. A traditional creativity test of the correlations'
originality would be inappropriate because of the kinship be-
tween law reporters and fact compilations. 12' Under a fact
compilation originality standard, the correlations in West's
volumes and most other reference works should satisfy the
Toro and Roxbury rationality test for copyrightable correla-
tions. 22 Rationally assigned parts numbers refer a user to spe-
cific parts, 23 and rational index citations refer a user to stories
on particular topics.124 Similarly, by referring users to the spe-
cific location of judicial material in a West reporter, West's cita-
tion correlations are rational, publicly useful, and thus
copyrightable. 2 5 This analysis is not without difficulties;2 6
121. Like other compilations of facts, West's reporters aggregate public do-
main material in a usable form. Such works are not subject to the normal cre-
ativity requirement which, if applied, could defeat their copyrights. See supra
notes 40-41 (discussing the minimal originality scrutiny of fact compilations).
122. See supra notes 53-62 and accompanying text (describing the rational
correlation test gleaned from Toro and Roxbury).
123. See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text (discussing Toro's ra-
tional correlation requirements).
124. See supra note 60 (discussing Roxbury's rational correlations).
125. The West court described the rational ability of a West citation to lo-
cate material in a reporter. See West Publishing Co., 799 F.2d at 1222("Volumes and pages [in West's Reporter System] are numbered sequentially
to facilitate precise reference to West reports; citing the proper volume
number, series name, and page number communicates the exact location of a
West report, or a portion thereof, within the National Reporter System.").
126. One difficulty is that West's correlations would not succeed under the
Toro court's analysis. As described supra note 59, the Eighth Circuit in Toro
required that an individual part number relate some information about the
part that it referenced. Like the infirm parts numbers in Toro, an individual
West page number by itself communicates nothing about the location of spe-
cific material. The rationality of page numbers derives instead from their or-
der, like the alphabetical order of names in a directory, not from any meaning
in an individual correlation, like the indexed items in Roxbury. Although the
Toro analysis will not protect West, a broadened analysis based on the rational
order of the correlations will. See supra note 62 (criticizing Toro's standard of
rationality).
A further difficulty arises from an attempt to distinguish West and Toro
on their facts. The defendant in Toro used Toro's parts numbers to identify its
own replacement parts for Toro equipment. Toro Co. v. R & R Prods. Co., 787
F.2d 1208, 1210-11 (8th Cir. 1986). Thus, like Mead, Toro's competitor used
Toro's parts citation system to encroach on Toro's market. The Toro court's
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nevertheless, it does provide a court with a copyrighted subject
matter that protects a law reporter publisher's interests and
corresponds precisely with an appropriation like Mead's.1 7 A
reporter's rational correlations should therefore suffice as the
alternative basis necessary for a reference work's originality.
Once a court establishes the correlations' originality, it
should find no idea/expression obstacle to copyright because a
reporter's correlations are copyrightable expressions of an
idea.12 8 As the Toro court concluded, the idea of a numbering
system is not copyrightable.1 29 Nevertheless, if Toro's specific
correlations between parts and numbers were its expressions of
the idea of referencing parts, 130 West's specific correlations be-
closing statement reveals its acceptance of R & R's piratical actions: "While
federal law prohibits a competitor from taking advantage of another's intellec-
tual property .... the law does not foreclose a competitor from zeroing in on a
profitable market segment and offering an alternative product." Id. at 1216.
The only significant difference in the cases is the "original" arrangement un-
derlying West's citations as opposed to the "random" system used by Toro. As
this Comment has argued, however, West's original arrangement is irrelevant
to the copyright protection of its citations. The distinction is reduced, then, to
the differing originality of the correlations in these cases. Toro's parts num-
bers, if ordered in some rational manner, may have equalled West's correla-
tions in the rationality of their order. See infra note 62. Perhaps the best
distinction between the cases is the centrality of citation to West's product,
compared to the more extraneous nature of parts numbers to Toro's product.
It is nevertheless difficult to understand that two holdings so strongly protect-
ing opposite values (in West, the publisher's right to protection; in Toro, the
competitor's right to compete) could emerge from the same court on such sim-
ilar facts.
In addition, a simple rational order of numbers is far short of the intellec-
tual creativity traditionally required for originality. See Cooling Sys. & Flex-
ibles, Inc. v. Stuart Radiator, Inc., 777 F.2d 485, 492 (9th Cir. 1985) ("Obviously
an alphabetical list is not a protectible form of arranging proper names.");
supra note 22 (describing the traditional need for intellectual effort to meet
the originality requirement). Nevertheless, like fact compilations, West's
volumes need only a technical basis for originality to support their copyright.
See supra note 41 (describing courts' efforts to find a technical basis for origi-
nality in fact compilations).
127. See supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text (describing the impor-
tance of West's citation correlations to West, Mead, and to the legal commu-
nity); supra note 116 (identifying Mead's appropriation as the location of
material in West opinions).
128. Although neither the court of appeals nor the district court specifi-
cally discussed the idea/expression doctrine, both courts rejected Mead's con-
tention that West was attempting to copyright a numbering system. See West
Publishing Co. v. Mead Data Cent., Inc., 616 F. Supp. 1571, 1579 (D. Minn.
1985), affd, 799 F.2d 1219, 1228 (8th Cir. 1986), cert denied, 107 S. Ct. 962
(1987).
129. See Toro Co., 787 F.2d at 1212; supra text accompanying notes 64-67
(discussing the Toro idea/expression analysis).
130. Toro Co., 787 F.2d at 1212.
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tween page numbers and page content are similarly its copy-
rightable expressions of the idea of referencing material on a
page.131 As a result, if the correlations are original, West may
protect citations to its volumes without affecting any other pub-
lisher's use of a citation or page numbering system.132
Thus, although the West court concluded that West's page
numbers are an important part of its copyrighted case arrange-
ment,13 3 the better conclusion is that a reporter's page numbers
are part of its copyrighted original correlations between cita-
tions and judicial material on a specific page.
Because the copyright claim survives both idea/expression
and originality challenges, a law reporter publisher may poten-
tially prevent star pagination to its volumes. The publisher's
success in doing so depends on whether the competitor's use is
similar enough to the copyrighted material to evidence copying
and therefore constitute an impermissible infringement. 13 4 In
West, the Eighth Circuit struggled with the similarity of Mead's
use because Mead did not actually reproduce the case arrange-
ment135 on which the court built its analysis. The court at-
tempted to circumvent the infringement problem with
131. The court's recognition of a correlation copyright in Roxbury supports
this conclusion because the copyrightable correlations in that case contained
citations consisting largely of volume and page numbers. See New York Times
Co. v. Roxbury Data Interface, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 217, 220 (D.N.J. 1977) (copy-
rightable portion of the index was the correlation of data in the New York
Times with citations to the pages and volumes of that publication).
132. West may not, of course, copyright either the idea of citations or the
elements of a citation necessary for others to use the idea of citation (page and
volume numbers, for example). See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text
(idea/expression limitation on copyright subject matter).
133. West Publishing Co., 799 F.2d at 1227.
134. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text (discussing the infringe-
ment doctrine).
135. LEXIS will not display or print cases in the order of West's arrange-
ment. Mead used this fact to argue that LEXIS does not reproduce West's case
arrangement. West Publishing Co., 616 F. Supp. at 1579-80. The district court
rejected Mead's contention because data bases are flexible collections of infor-
mation retrievable in various forms. Thus "MDC need not physically arrange
its opinions within its computer bank in order to reproduce West's protected
arrangements." Id at 1580. The typical arrangement accessible to the user
displays the cases containing the user's search request. See Brief for Appel-
lant, supra note 83, at 14-15 (describing LEXIS display format). This arrange-
ment is totally dissimilar to West's, and star pagination would make no
difference. A LEXIS user, however, may potentially recreate West's arrange-
ment with, see supra note 99, or without, see infra note 138, star pagination,
but only at great effort and expense. Thus, Mead does not promote or offer a
duplication of West's case arrangement, even with star pagination, short of bi-
zarre and herculean efforts by the user to reconstruct that arrangement.
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alternative explanations. The court first reasoned that because
star pagination enables LEXIS users to page through a West
volume, that use infringes on West's arrangement. 136 This anal-
ysis is weak because it is highly improbable that LEXIS users
would page through multiple opinions to reproduce West's ar-
rangement.' 37 Further, West's concession of the first page cita-
tion gives LEXIS users access' to West's entire case
arrangement even without star pagination.138 Alternatively,
the court found infringement because Mead's use would reveal
the precise location of portions of West's case reports. 39 This
alternative is no more convincing than the first. Although an
analysis based on location revelation more accurately reflects
the nature of Mead's appropriation, 40 it has nothing to do with
West's original case arrangement.141 Thus, in its second in-
fringement finding, the court identified the actual nature of the
infringement, but did so at the expense of its copyright theory.
The problematic nature of Mead's appropriation disap-
pears, however, if the copyright is based on West's correlations.
Mead developed star pagination to reveal the correlation be-
tween West's page numbers and the material on that particular
page.'1 2 If West's correlations are copyrighted, Mead's use is an
infringement because LEXIS's star pagination is an exact dupli-
cation of West's copyrighted work. Thus, although an arrange-
136. West Publishing Co., 799 F.2d at 1227.
137. See supra note 99.
138. See supra note 90 (discussing West's fair use concession of first page
citations). LEXIS's Autocite feature creates this opportunity. Autocite enables
the user to enter a case citation to view the subsequent and prior history of the
case. If the user enters an internal page number, such as that provided by
Shephard's Citations, rather than the first page of the opinion, Autocite refers
the user to the case containing that internal page. Thus, by entering the page
number preceding the first page of the last opinion in a West volume, the user
could work backwards and discover the exact order of cases within the vol-
ume.
This usage, however, is as bizarre as that invoked by the West court, see
supra notes 99, 135. More to the point, if such recreation of West's arrange-
ment occurs, Mead has not copied the arrangement-the user has. Unless
Mead offered a reasonably foreseeable opportunity for a user to reproduce
West's arrangement, Mead should not be responsible for a user's unanticipated
manipulation of the data base.
139. West Publishing Co., 799 F.2d at 1227-28.
140. Mead's revelation of the location of West materials is the actual pur-
pose of star pagination, not recreation of West's case arrangement. See supra
note 116.
141. See supra notes 107-20 and accompanying text (arguing that the corre-
lation of citation and page content, not the case arrangement, is the actual sub-
ject matter of West's copyright and Mead's appropriation).
142. See West Publishing Co., 799 F.2d at 1228; supra note 116.
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ment-based approach forced the Eighth Circuit into a strained
infringement analysis, a correlation theory accurately measures
the extent of star pagination's infringement of a reporter's
copyrighted correlations.143
Although fair use may justify an infringement, 44 star pagi-
nation to a law reporter falls outside even the generous defense
available to the user of a reference work. 45 Mead's star pagi-
nation is a wholesale appropriation of West's correlations and is
intended to improve LEXIS as a tool for researching and citing
opinions. Unless LEXIS's market is narrowly defined, 46
143. Because an arrangement-based approach produced infringement
problems, the West court invoked copyright by association. See supra note
101. Regardless of its value in other settings, the West court should have
avoided the copyright by association theory. Like the court's original arrange-
ment analysis, in this setting, copyright by association suffers by relying on the
irrelevant case arrangement, i.e., that West's page numbers are protected be-
cause they are closely associated with the copyrighted case arrangement. West
Publishing Co., 799 F.2d at 1228. If the court had adopted a correlation-based
analysis, the untested copyright by association theory would not have been
necessary to find infringement.
144. See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text (discussing the fair use
doctrine). Mead's fair use argument did not succeed before the district court
because Mead's use was a commercial one of large magnitude that would ad-
versely affect West's hardbound reporter market. West Publishing Co. v.
Mead Data Cent., Inc., 616 F. Supp. 1571, 1580-81 (D. Minn. 1985), affd, 799
F.2d 1219 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 962 (1987). Although Mead
did not raise its fair use argument on appeal, the appellate court stated its
agreement with the district court's analysis of this point. See West Publishing
Co., 799 F.2d at 1228 n.3.
145. See supra notes 35-38, 68 and accompanying text (discussing fair use
and reference works).
146. LEXIS's market could be narrowly defined as that of computer-as-
sisted legal research products, rather than all legal research products. This
definition would place LEXIS in competition with WESTLAW, not West's
hardbound reporters. This definition, however, emphasizes media over func-
tion and thus suffers under Nimmer's criticism of media-oriented approaches.
See 3 M. NIaMER, supra note 13, § 13.05[B] (arguing that the medium is irrele-
vant and the function of the two works determinative in a fair use market ef-
fect consideration). See also supra note 38 (citing cases that discussed the role
of function in a market effect consideration for the fair use defense). Under
Nimmer's analysis, the issue is whether LEXIS's star pagination is offered to
the public to perform the same function as West's reporters. If the function of
both products is legal research, LEXIS cannot usurp West's right to reproduce
its page numbers in a different medium, that of computer-assisted legal re-
search.
A more promising narrow definition of LEXIS's market therefore distin-
guishes the function, not the media, of LEXIS and hardbound reporters.
LEXIS users may use that product primarily for rapid location of relevant
opinions, a likely conclusion considering the cost of computer time. In con-
trast, hardbound reporters may be more useful for detailed study of text
rather than subject matter research. See J. KINSOCK, supra note 2, at 55 (argu-
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Mead's use performs at least some part of the function of
West's volumes in a competitive, potentially market-sup-
planting manner.147 Mead's argument, therefore, encounters
difficulty with the market effect limitation on a fair use de-
fense. 48 Thus, although citation to a law reporter should gen-
erally be a fair use, star pagination in a competing work loses
that status due to its wholesale, market-affecting nature.
In sum, although the West court struggled with its ar-
rangement-based analysis, a law reporter publisher should be
able to prevent wholesale appropriation of its citation correla-
tions through star pagination. Because of their kinship with
copyrightable compilations of facts, reporters should find suffi-
cient room within the law for copyright protection. With strict
ing that the costs of LEXIS encouraged users to print lists of West citations to
save computer time and then use West volumes for actual research). If this
were the case, LEXIS's function would differ from that of West's reporters
and star pagination would be a fair use. West, however, has produced some
evidence that LEXIS's use of star pagination will reduce West's reporter sales,
indicating a substantial functional link between the two. See infra note 147
(discussing some evidence of market effect); see also J. KINsOCK, supra note 2,
at 55 (speculating that LEXIS's competition with West's hardbound reporters,
not WESTLAW, forced Mead to drastically reduce its rates, hoping the reduc-
tion would encourage users to spend more time studying opinions on LEXIS
rather than using West volumes).
147. Some detrimental effect of star pagination on West's hardbound re-
porter market is likely, but only conjectural at this point. The Eighth Circuit
concluded that Mead's use of star pagination would "pro tanto reduce anyone's
need to buy West's books." West Publishing Co., 799 F.2d at 1227. This is not
a foregone conclusion; LEXIS users may still prefer to purchase the
hardbound reporters for copying, quicker access, and use of the West head-
notes and key number systems. See also supra note 13 (effect of anticomputer
bias on continuation of the reporter market). Nevertheless, some diminution
in West's hardbound reporter market is possible because researchers could ob-
tain both opinions and full West citations from LEXIS. West produced some
support for this prediction in the affidavit of the Co-Acting Director of the
University of Minnesota Law Library, who stated that the anticipated intro-
duction of star pagination was used as justification for cancellation of the Min-
nesota Law Review's subscriptions to the Federal Reporter, Second Series and
the Federal Supplement. See Brief for Appellant, supra note 83, app. at A192
(cited by the district court in West Publishing Co., 616 F. Supp. at 1582). West
also produced affidavits of other library personnel conjecturing a reduction in
demand for West volumes. See Brief for Appellant, supra note 83, app. at
A164-A165, A168-A170, A173-A186, A197-A198. In light of the West decision,
the Minnesota Law Review has asserted that the Library's cancellation was
without merit and that the Review's subscriptions should be reinstated with-
out further delay. See Petition for Reinstatement of Our Reporter Subscrip-
tions, September 10, 1986 (located somewhere in a filing cabinet in the
Minnesota Law Review office).
148. See supra notes 35-38.
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limitations under fair use,1 49 courts should prevent wholesale
usurpation of the valuable citation correlations of law
reporters.150
The West court's analysis theoretically could support copy-
right protection much less justified than the protection af-
forded West. Although West conceded that use of its first page
citations was fair, the court's arrangement-based analysis could
sustain copyright in any citation to a copyrighted volume, in-
cluding first page citations.' 5 ' Application of this protection is
probably limited to the legal field because of the law's unique
dependence on citation. The legal community would neverthe-
less tremble in contemplating the potential damage resulting
from full copyright protection for citations. Mitigating the
damage to some degree is the market benefit, rather than
harm, that most volumes receive from being cited, because pub-
lishers who benefit from citation are not likely to attempt to
enjoin it.152
These practical limitations are too unpredictable, however,
to prevent excessive harm to the public from the West court's
analysis. In keeping with the appropriate protection for a work
intended to be referenced, future courts should narrow the po-
tential damage by preventing only substantial appropriations
for competitive purposes. West, for example, should have no
power to prevent even wholesale use of citations to a West vol-
149. See supra note 69 and accompanying text (fair use limitations on a ref-
erence work) and infra notes 153-54 (application of these limitations to West).
150. Mead may still claim the right to star page to any volumes whose
copyright has expired. Under the federal copyright statute, West volumes
published before January 1, 1978, may retain their copyright for 28 years plus
a renewal period of 47 years, a total of 75 years. 17 U.S.C. § 304(a)-(b) (1982).
Volumes copyrighted before 1913 therefore may be unprotected. Considering
the minimal use of these older opinions, however, this possibility likely does
not provide Mead much solace.
151. If West had not conceded the use of first page citations, it could have
argued that the entire citation protected its copyrighted arrangement. Under
the court's reasoning, Mead's use of any part of the citation would infringe on
the respective copyrighted portion of West's arrangement. Further, because
Mead's use was a wholesale one, the court made no attempt to determine how
many citations a competitor could use without infringing. Without other limi-
tations, then, the West rationale theoretically protects any use of a citation
that appropriated any part of a copyrightable arrangement.
152. West, for example, never sued to prevent Mead's use of citations to
the first page of its opinions, apparently because such citations referred users
to West volumes, thus benefiting West's market. See West Publishing Co., 616
F. Supp. at 1579 (West's fair use concession of first page citations is "not neces-
sarily altruism on West's part. That citation calls a researcher to West's
books-which they are in business to sell as well as create.").
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ume by a noncompeting work,153 or a less than substantial use
of citations to a West volume in a competing work,154 if neither
use diminishes West's reporter market. In light of the legal
community's need for generous citation privileges, any uses
that do not destroy a publisher's incentive to publish are justi-
fied and should be court-approved.155
In addition to its copyright law ramifications, the West de-
cision may affect the development of computerized legal re-
search. In the short run, the decision in West's favor may
hinder development because Mead and other potential com-
puterized legal research companies will not be able to offer a
significant improvement in their systems.156 Not only will
153. For example, Shephard's Citations include nearly as many West cita-
tions as LEXIS would with star pagination. Because Shephard's use is symbi-
otic rather than competing, however, West should not be able to prevent
Shephard's near wholesale use of West citations. See supra notes 68-69 and ac-
companying text (arguing that fair use of a reference work should be broadly
available as long as the use is not wholesale and competing).
154. For example, a reporting service should be able to star page to West if
the service is specialized enough so that its use of West citations will not affect
the market for any West volume. For example, the Bureau of National Affairs
should be able to star page to West opinions in its United States Patent Quar-
terly because the specialized nature of this publication will not threaten sales
of West's more general reporters. Neither should West be able to control cita-
tions to its reporters to prevent competition with a West publication that is not
a reporter. For example, American Jurisprudence, a legal encyclopedia pub-
lished by the Lawyers Co-operative Publishing Company and Bancroft-
Whitney Company, competes directly with Corpus Juris Secundum, a similar
work published by West. The former uses many, but not wholesale, West cita-
tions. Although American Jurisprudence may threaten Corpus Juris
Secundum's market, West should not be able to prevent the former's use of
citations to West's reporters because the use is less than wholesale and does
not threaten the protected work, the reporter. American Jurisprudence could
not, of course, copy Corpus Juris Secundum without violating that publica-
tion's copyright.
155. The same court that initially decided West may have opportunity to
test the limits of that decision. West is being sued by Bancroft-Whitney Co.
Bancroft-Whitney Co. v. West Publishing Co., No. 4-86-473 (N.D. Tex. filed
Dec. 16, 1985, transferred to D. Minn. June 10, 1986). The suit involves Ban-
croft's use of numbers applied by West in its compilation of Texas statutes to
certain statutes that the Texas legislature did not number. West is attempting
to prevent Bancroft from using the West numbers in a competitive statutory
compilation. See Lawyers Co-op. Brief Amicus Curiae, supra note 5, at 11-12.
Copyright protection for such an insubstantial addition to an existing number-
ing scheme seems unlikely, although the court may require Bancroft to simply
renumber those statutes in its own form rather than borrow West's.
156. The absence of internal citations weakens the incentive to purchase
computer services because subscribers must still purchase hardbound report-
ers. This lack of investment, in return, weakens the computer industry's abil-
ity to improve its services. West, however, is in a unique position. As the
holder of the copyright to its page numbers, West can add star pagination to
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these systems be less valuable, but the legal community cannot
be fully weaned from using the less efficient hardbound report-
ers as long as the computer industry lacks access to reporter
page numbers that are necessary for citation. In the long run,
however, a decision favoring West may prove beneficial by com-
pelling computer research companies to develop a workable
system of citation to computerized opinions. 157 Growing along
with computerized research, the use of these citations should
eventually compete with and possibly displace the use of
citation to hardbound reporters. LEXIS's star pagination to
other reporters, on the other hand, would prolong the com-
puter industry's dependence on hardbound reporter citation
WESTLAW at any time. The West decision will not therefore hinder the de-
velopment of WESTLAW. Nevertheless, the competitive edge the decision
gives West may hinder development because it would destroy the benefits of
the present keen competition. See supra note 2 (discussing the benefits of
competition between LEXIS and WESTLAW) and supra note 3 (discussing the
competitive advantage West would gain for WESTLAW under the West deci-
sion).
If West refuses to add star pagination to WESTLAW, Mead might at some
point claim that West has lost its copyright through misuse in refusing to offer
its protected work for the public's benefit. This claim has surface appeal, but
would face serious obstacles. The holder of a copyright has the right of repro-
duction and may exercise this right by refusing to reproduce the work. See
Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932) ("The owner of the copyright,
if he pleases, may refrain from vending or licensing and content himself with
simply exercising the right to exclude others from using his property."); 17
U.S.C. § 106 (1982) (granting exclusive rights of reproduction, publication, and
distribution to the copyright owner); see also 3 M. NINMER, supra note 13,
§ 13.05[A], at 13-76 to -77 (fair use is severely limited when applied to unpub-
lished works because the owner has the choice of whether to publish). Refusal
to make a protected work available, therefore, is not a misuse in itself. Copy-
right misuse is most likely if a copyright owner ties the availability of the
copyrighted item to a required purchase of an uncopyrighted one. See Morton
Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 491-94 (1942) (holder of a patent for
a salt tablet canning machine misused the patent by requiring buyers of the
machine to buy the holder's unpatented tablets); 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 13,
§ 13.09[A] (misuse of a copyright usually involves copyright owners in illegal
combinations or license tie-ins). Because West does not tie the use of its cita-
tions to the purchase of any of its products or services, a misuse argument is
not likely to succeed.
157. The Blue Book currently treats citation to computerized opinions as
relatively unimportant, limiting use to unpublished opinions only. See BLUE
BOOK, supra note 4, at 51. The citation form is also awkward (requiring avail-
able date, name of the computer system, name of the library, and name of the
file), and, on LEXIS at least, does not contain any method of locating material
within an opinion. LEXIS has no internal page numbers on its opinions.
West's version, WESTLAW, numbers computer pages, but these numbers do
not conform to West's hardbound reporter page numbers. See WEST PUBLISH-
ING CO., WESTLAW FOR LAW STUDENTs 48-49 (1983).
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forms rather than encourage innovative development of
alternatives. 58
CONCLUSION
Regardless of the effect on the computer research industry,
the West court's prevention of LEXIS's star pagination is justi-
fied. Copyright protection for West's correlations between its
citations and the judicial material they locate is necessary to
ensure that publishers like West have sufficient incentive to
produce reference works. Moreover, with appropriate limita-
tions on publishers' rights, copyright protection for the correla-
tions will not restrict the legal community's current use of
citations because only wholesale, competing uses will be prohib-
ited. Future consideration of citation copyright, however,
should involve a more useful analysis than one based on case
arrangement.159 Regardless, West emerges a winner, as it did
in so many earlier battles, from the first installment of what
threatens to become the space age version of the legal publish-
ers' wars.
William L. Anderson
158. The development of a workable computer citation system would, how-
ever, at least temporarily create the undesirable need for another parallel cita-
tion. Because West volumes would continue to be the primary source of
citations for many years, a citation to LEXIS or WESTLAW would most likely
require augmentation by a West citation and by any other hardbound volumes
currently required by the Blue Book or other citation systems.
159. The district court might, for instance, pursue its alternative basis for
protecting West's page numbers-the value of the page numbers as an index
and locator of case material. See supra note 120 (discussing the district court's
alternative analysis).
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